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I. INTRODUCTION 
Copyrights are intended to encourage creative works through the mechanism 
of a statutorily created1 limited property right, which some prominent think 
tanks and congressional organizations have referred to as a form of govern-
ment regulation.2 Under both economic3 and legal analysis,4 they are recog-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
* Derek Khanna is a fellow with X-Lab and a technology policy consultant. As a policy 
consultant he has never worked for any organizations that lobby or with personal stakes in 
copyright terms, and neither has Derek ever lobbied Congress. He was previously a Yale 
Law School Information Society Project Fellow. He was featured in Forbes’ 2014 list of top 
30 under 30 for law in policy and selected as a top 200 global leader of tomorrow for spear-
heading the successful national campaign on cell phone unlocking which led to the enact-
ment of copyright reform legislation to legalize phone unlocking. He has spoken at the Con-
servative Political Action Conference, South by Southwest, the International Consumer 
Electronics Show and at several colleges across the country as a paid speaker with the Fed-
eralist Society. He also serves as a columnist or contributor to National Review, The Atlan-
tic and Forbes. He was previously a professional staff member for the House Republican 
Study Committee, where he authored the widely read House Republican Study Committee 
report “Three Myths about Copyright Law.” 
 1 See Edward C. Walterscheld, Defining the Patent and Copyright Term: Term Limits 
and the Intellectual Property Clause, 7 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 315, 383 (2000) (“Ever since 
Wheaton v. Peters, copyright in published works has been understood to be a creature of 
statute.”); see also Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 28 (1979) 
(“A copyright, like a patent, is a statutory grant of monopoly privileges.”); See Wheaton v. 
Peters, 33 U.S. 591, 660 (1834) 
No such right at the common law had been recognized in England, when the colony of 
Penn was organized. Long afterwards, literary property became a subject of controver-
sy, but the question was involved in great doubt and perplexity; and a little more than a 
century ago, it was decided by the highest judicial court in England, that the right of 
authors could not be asserted at common law, but under the statute. 
Id. 
 2 James Pethokoukis, Regulatory & Financial Reforms to Combat Cronyism and Mod-
ernize Our Economy, in ROOM TO GROW: CONSERVATIVE REFORMS FOR A LIMITED GOVERN-
MENT AND A THRIVING MIDDLE CLASS 81, 85 (YG Network ed., 1st ed. 2014), available at 
http://ygnetwork.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/Room-To-Grow.pdf (“[O]ver the years, 
copyright and patent law has evolved into cronyist protection of the revenue streams of 
powerful incumbent companies—a type of regulation that hampers innovation and entrepre-
neurship.”). 
 3 Monopolies are the accurate economic term for the instrument of copyright. Brief for 
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nized as a form of government-granted monopoly.5 Economic efficiency and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
George A. Akerlof et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 3, Eldred v. Ashcroft, 
537 U.S. 186 (2003) (No. 01-618) (“In basic terms, copyright protection grants a monopoly 
over the distribution and sale of a work and certain new works based upon it. The copyright 
monopoly has several costs.”); MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM: 40TH ANNI-
VERSARY EDITION 127-28 (University of Chicago Press eds., 2002) 
In both patents and copyright, there is clearly a strong prima facie case for establishing 
property rights. . . . At the same time, there are costs involved. . . . The specific condi-
tions attached to patents and copyrights [such as term lengths] are matters of expedien-
cy to be determined by practical considerations. I am myself inclined to believe that a 
much shorter period of patent protection would be preferable. 
Id.; FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, INDIVIDUALISM & ECONOMIC ORDER 113-114, (1948) 
The problem of the prevention of monopoly and the preservation of competition is 
raised much more acutely in certain other fields to which the concept of property has 
been extended only in recent times. . . . [the extension of property like rights to copy-
right has] done a great to foster the growth of monopoly and that here drastic reforms 
may be required. 
Id. For an example of an economic analysis of optimal copyright term that uses “monopoly” 
as the accurate economic term, see RUFUS POLLOCK, FOREVER MINUS A DAY? CALCULATING 
OPTIMAL COPYRIGHT TERM 2 (Univ. of Cambridge ed., 2009), available at 
http://rufuspollock.org/papers/optimal__term.pdf (“Extending term on these works prolongs 
the copyright monopoly and therefore reduces welfare by hindering access to, and reuse of, 
these works.”); Robert M. Hurt, The Economic Rationale of Copyright, 56 THE AM. ECON. 
REV. 421, 421–32 (1966), available at JSTOR. 
 4 See generally MELVILLE B. NIMMER, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF LITERARY, MUSICAL 
AND ARTISTIC PROPERTY AND THE PROTECTION OF IDEAS (M. Bender ed., 1965) (on Copy-
right, 10-volume work that is the most cited work in the field and considered to be the lead-
ing treatise on copyright law referring to copyright as a “limited monopoly”); See also WIL-
LIAM PATRY, HOW TO FIX COPYRIGHT (2011) (another more recent treatise on copyright law, 
referring to copyright as a “monopoly”); A WestLaw search of “copyright” and “monopoly” 
retrieved 67 Supreme Court cases and 2,497 cases total.  Since Westlaw is incomplete, the 
number of potential cases could be higher, however not all retrievals are instances of copy-
right being referred to as a “monopoly.” But a check of a number of them demonstrates that 
most of them are. For major Supreme Court cases using term “monopoly” see, for example, 
Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 260 (2003) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (mentioning “the anti-
monopoly environment in which the Framers wrote the Clause,” which suggests the way the 
Framers understood “the basic purpose of the Copyright Clause”); Broad. Music, Inc. v. 
Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 28 (1979) (Stevens, J. dissenting) (“A copyright, 
like a patent, is a statutory grant of monopoly privileges.”); Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 
219 (1954) (Douglas, J., concurring) (“[M]ay statuettes be granted the monopoly of the 
copyright?”). 
 5 The Supreme Court has long recognized that copyrights are government granted mo-
nopolies. See Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517, 526 (1994) (“We have often recog-
nized the monopoly privileges that Congress has authorized, while ‘intended to motivate the 
creative activity of authors and inventors by the provision of a special reward,’ are limited in 
nature and must ultimately serve the public good.”); see also Harper & Row v. Nation En-
terprises, 471 U.S. 539, 546 (1985) (quoting Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 
539, 477 (1984)) (“The monopoly created by copyright thus rewards the individual author in 
order to benefit the public.”); see also Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417, 
429 (1984) (“Congress … has been assigned the task of defining the scope of the limited 
monopoly that should be granted to authors or inventors in order to give the public appro-
priate access to their work product.”); See also Twentieth Century v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 
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constitutional law both suggest copyrights should solve potential market fail-
ures, in order to “promote the progress of the sciences.”6 In examining the spe-
cific term lengths for copyright and patent, Milton Friedman deemed the sub-
ject a matter of “expediency” to be determined by “practical considerations.”7 
Friedrich Hayek distinguished copyright from traditional property rights, iden-
tified a number of problems with modern copyright, specifically condemning 
the “slavish application of the concept of property,” and called for “drastic re-
forms.”8 Adam Smith, referred to copyright as a “temporary monopoly” pro-
vided by government, and compared copyrights and patents as similar to gov-
ernment providing a monopoly on trade, granted for merchants who explore 
“remote and barbarous nations” because these monopolies are “the easiest and 
most natural way in which the state can recompense them …of which the pub-
lic is afterwards to reap the benefit.”9 The conservative movement, which 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
156 (1975) (“The limited scope of the copyright holder’s statutory monopoly ... reflects a 
balance of competing claims upon the public interest”); see also Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 
286 U.S. 123, 127 (1932) (“The sole interest of the United States and the primary object in 
conferring the monopoly lie in the general benefits derived by the public from the labors of 
authors.”). 
 6 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.; Derek Khanna, R Street Policy Study No. 20: Guarding 
Against Abuse: Restoring Constitutional Copyright, R STREET 1 (Apr. 2014), 
http://www.rstreet.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/RSTREET20.pdf. 
 7 See FRIEDMAN, supra note 3, at 127-28 
These are very superficial comments on a difficult and important problem. Their aim is 
not to suggest any specific answer but only to show why patents and copyrights are in a 
different class from the other governmentally supported monopolies and to illustrate 
the problem of social policy that they raise. One thing is clear. The specific conditions 
attached to patents and copyrights for example, the grant of patent protection for seven-
teen years rather than some other period are not a matter of principle. They are matters 
of expediency to be determined by practical considerations. I am myself inclined to be-
lieve that a much shorter period of patent protection would be preferable. 
Id. 
 8 See HAYEK, supra note 3, at 113-114 
The problem of prevention of monopoly and the preservation of competition is raised 
much more acutely in certain other field to which the concept of property has been ex-
tended only in recent times. I am thinking here of the extension of the concept of prop-
erty to such rights and privileges as patents for inventions, copyright, trade-marks, and 
the like. It seems to me beyond doubt that in these fields a slavish application of the 
concept of property as it has been developed for material things has done a great deal to 
foster the growth of monopoly and that here drastic reforms may be required if compe-
tition is to be made to work. 
Id. 
 9 ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NA-
TIONS 617 (1776), available at http://www2.hn.psu.edu/faculty/jmanis/adam-smith/wealth-
nations.pdf 
When a company of merchants undertake, at their own risk and expense, to establish a 
new trade with some remote and barbarous nation, it may not be unreasonable to incor-
porate them into a joint stock company, and to grant them, in case of their success, a 
monopoly of the trade for a certain number of years. It is the easiest and most natural 
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largely has supported originalist methods of interpreting the Constitution, tra-
ditionally has been in favor of copyright reform, with proposals usually includ-
ing shorter copyright terms.10 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
way in which the state can recompense them for hazarding a dangerous and expensive 
experiment, of which the public is afterwards to reap the benefit. A temporary monopo-
ly of this kind may be vindicated upon the same principles upon which a like monopoly 
of a new machine is granted to its inventor, and that of a new book to its author. But 
upon the expiration of the term, the monopoly ought certainly to determine; the forts 
and garrisons, if it was found necessary to establish any, to be taken into the hands of 
government, their value to be paid to the company, and the trade to be laid open to all 
the subjects of the state. By a perpetual monopoly, all the other subjects of the state are 
taxed very absurdly in two different ways: first, by the high price of goods, which, in 
the case of a free trade, they could buy much cheaper; and, secondly, by their total ex-
clusion from a branch of business which it might be both convenient and profitable for 
many of them to carry on. 
Id. 
 10 See Steve Forbes, Fact and Comment, FORBES (Mar. 31, 2003, 12:00 AM), 
www.forbes.com/forbes/2003/0331/027.html 
The extension was pushed primarily by Disney, which didn’t want any of its old Mick-
ey Mouse cartoons entering the public domain. . . . Maybe Congress should just be 
done with it and declare that a copyright is forever. . . . Stanford Law School Professor 
Lawrence Lessig has proposed a sensible compromise. Borrowing a page from patent 
law, wherein holders have to pay a fee every few years to keep their patents current, 
Lessig would apply that principle to copyrights: After a certain number of years, copy-
right holders would have to pay a nominal amount of money to maintain protection. If 
the holder didn’t pay the charge for, say, three years, the work would go into the public 
domain. 
Id.; Phyllis Schlafly, Why is Congress Criminalizing Copyright Law?, EAGLE FORUM (June 
24, 1998), http://www.eagleforum.org/column/1998/june98/98-06-24.html (“Congress 
seems intent on changing all our intellectual property laws to benefit big corporations.”); 
Phyllis Schlafly, Why Disney Has Clout with the Republican Congress, EAGLE FORUM (Nov. 
25, 1998), www.eagleforum.org/column/1998/nov98/98-11-25.html 
‘Limited time’ is not only a constitutional requirement, it is an excellent rule. There is 
no good reason for the remote descendants of James Madison, Julia Ward Howe, or 
Thomas Nast to receive royalties on the Federalist Papers, the Battle Hymn of the Re-
public, or Santa Claus. . . . [W]hy did Judiciary Committee Republicans quietly put 
through legislation that hurts the public interest but is so immensely profitable to Dis-
ney? 
Id.; Phyllis Schlafly, Copyright Extremists Should Not Control Information, TOWN-
HALL.COM (Dec. 31, 2002), www.eagleforum.org/column/2003/jan03/03-01-01.shtml 
Copyright extremists are committing all this mischief under current law. Yet, the music 
labels and Hollywood argue that current laws are not strong enough, and they are lob-
bying for an assortment of new anti-consumer legislation. . . . We should not permit 
copyright extremists to exploit current laws for that goal, and we should reject their 
demands that Congress give them even broader power to control and license infor-
mation. 
Id.; Phyllis Schlafly, Copyrights and the Constitution, EAGLE FORUM (July 2, 2002), 
http://townhall.com/columnists/phyllisschlafly/2002/07/02/copyrights_and_the_constitution 
(“The Disney Law mocks the constitutional requirement of “limited times” by extending 
copyright protection to 95 years.”); See also Brief for Eagle Forum Education and Legal 
Defense Fund and the Association of American Physicians and Surgeons, Inc. as Amici 
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“Historically, copyright terms have been quite short.11 As required by Article 
1, Section 8, Clause 8 of the U.S. Constitution, copyright can only be granted 
for ‘limited times.’”12 Until 1976, the average copyright term was 32.2 years.13  
Today, the U.S. copyright term is the life of the author, plus seventy years.14  
A useful backdrop to compare this expansion is to the growth, or relative 
non-growth, of patent terms. Both patents and copyright started at 14 years in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003) (No. 01618) 
The U.S. Constitution is fundamentally different from the rules of the European Union 
and virtually every other country. The Copyright Clause takes a more limited view of 
intellectual property than other jurisdictions, thereby allowing creativity and competi-
tion to flourish. Europe, for example, generally does not allow the ‘fair use’ that is con-
stitutionally required in the United States. 
Id.; HAYEK, supra note 3, at 113–14 
The problem of the prevention of monopoly and the preservation of competition is 
raised much more acutely in certain other fields to which the concept of property has 
been extended only in recent times. . . . It seems to me beyond doubt that in [patents 
and copyright] a slavish application of the concept of property as it has been developed 
for material things has done a great deal to foster the growth of monopoly and that here 
drastic reforms may be required if competition is to be made to work. 
Id.; FRIEDMAN, supra note 3, at 128 
In both patents and copyright, there is clearly a strong prima facie case for establishing 
property rights. . . . At the same time, there are costs involved. . . . The specific condi-
tions attached to patents and copyrights [such as term lengths] are matters of expedien-
cy to be determined by practical considerations.  I am myself inclined to believe that a 
much shorter period of patent protection would be preferable. 
Id.; Richard Posner, Do Patent and Copyright Law Restrict Competition and Creativity 
Excessively?, BECKER POSNER BLOG (Sept. 30, 2012), http://bit.ly/1z3o6s5 
Copyright protection seems on the whole too extensive. . . . The most serious problem 
with copyright law is the length of copyright protection, which for most works is now 
from the creation of the work to 70 years after the author’s death. . . . The next most se-
rious problem is the courts’ narrow interpretation of “fair use.” . . . The problem is that 
the boundaries of fair use are ill defined, and copyright owners try to narrow them as 
much as possible. 
Id.; Robert Merges & Glenn Reynolds, The Proper Scope of the Copyright and Patent Pow-
er, 37 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 45, 65-66 (2000) 
One possible approach to the constitutional test we advocate would be to examine a 
proposed extension from the hypothetical perspective of an author . . . could the term of 
protection possibly serve as additional motivation to set pen to paper, or to sit down at 
the lab bench? Or does it stretch out so far in time that the latter years of the term are 
irrelevant to any potential creator? This approach essentially translates proposed patent 
extensions into the ‘present value’ calculations familiar to accountants. . . . [The Con-
stitution] states a utilitarian, incentive-based rationale for intellectual property protec-
tion. If the term of protection could not, under any plausible set of assumptions, serve 
as an incentive, it fails the constitutional requirement of a forward-looking grant of 
property rights. 
Id. 
 11 R Street Policy Study No. 20, supra note 6, at 1. 
 12 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.; R Street Policy Study No. 20, supra note 6, at 1. 
 13 LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE- THE NATURE AND FUTURE OF CREATIVITY, 135 
(Penguin Books 2004). 
 14 R Street Policy Study No. 20, supra note 6, at 1; 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (2012). 
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the United States, but patent terms have only had minor increases.15 Today’s 
patent term is either seventeen years from patent issuance or twenty years from 
patent filing, whichever is longer.16  As legal historian Edward Walterscheid 
puts it, while patents and copyrights were included in the same clause of the 
Constitution and originally had the same or similar durations, “the statutory 
patent term has increased by 43% while the statutory copyright term has in-
creased by almost 580%.”17 Congress must justify why a twenty-year term can 
provide sufficient incentive to inventors, but not to writers and artists. 
The Supreme Court has been clear that the ultimate purpose of the Constitu-
tion’s Copyright Clause is “to stimulate artistic creativity for the general public 
good,”18 specifically rejecting the sweat of the brow arguments to justify copy-
right.19 Based upon copyright’s purpose this Essay will establish that current 
terms, life of the author plus seventy years, are counter-productive and com-
pletely inconsistent from what the Founders had in mind. The Supreme Court, 
however, has deferred to Congress to set a copyright term consistent with the 
Constitution.20 While the Court has noted that infinite copyright clearly would 
be unconstitutional,21 they have assessed the current copyright term of life of 
the author plus seventy years to be, technically, limited.22 Further, in the U.S. v. 
Eldred case, often cited by the content industry as evidence that perpetual ex-
tensions of copyright terms are constitutional, the Court never addressed 
whether current copyright terms are the “functional equivalent of perpetual 
copyright” because it wasn’t presented to the Court on certiorari.23 
The Court’s reluctance to restore the public meaning of the Copyright 
Clause for a truly limited copyright term leaves the task of returning copyright 
to its original public meaning and purpose up to the other branches – as each 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 15 R Street Policy Study No. 20, supra note 6, at 2; 35 U.S.C. § 154(c)(1) (2012). 
 16 35 U.S.C. § 154(c)(1). 
 17 Walterscheid, supra note 1, at 389. 
 18 Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975). 
 19 Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co., 499 U.S. 340, 349-50 (1991). 
 20 See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 192 (2003); see Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 
873, 885 (2012). 
 21 Eldred, 537 U.S. at 241 (2003) (Justice Stevens dissenting) 
The express grant of a perpetual copyright would unquestionably violate the textual re-
quirement that the authors’ exclusive rights be only “for limited Times.” Whether the 
extraordinary length of the grants authorized by the 1998 Act are invalid because they 
are the functional equivalent of perpetual copyrights is a question that need not be an-
swered in this case because the question presented by the certiorari petition merely 
challenges Congress’ power to extend retroactively the terms of existing copyrights. 
Id. 
 22 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (2012); Eldred, 537 U.S. at 199. In Eldred the Court stated that at 
the time of the Framing, “limited” meant “‘confine[d] within certain bounds.’” Therefore, “a 
time span appropriately ‘limited’ as applied to future copyrights does not automatically 
cease to be ‘limited’ when applied to existing copyrights.” Id. 
 23 Eldred, 537 U.S. at 241 (Justice Stevens dissenting). 
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branch of government has a constitutionally imposed, obligation to ensure that 
legislation is consistent with the original public meaning of the Constitution. 
This Essay will start by identifying the original public meaning of the copy-
right clause in the Constitution and then argue that restoring constitutional 
copyright is up to Congress to fix. It will show how a dedicated group of spe-
cial interests has systematically distorted this system since 1790, specifically 
since the 1970’s. Then it will explore the documented costs of excessive copy-
right duration of unprecedented length in American history – such long copy-
right duration that it restricts individual liberty, limits individuals’ access to 
historical material, increases transaction costs for content creators and is result-
ing in the epidemic of orphan works. Copyright terms 580% longer than those 
of our Founders significantly impedes digital archiving of our cultural heritage, 
degrades education and learning opportunities, depresses the amount of public-
ly available content, and prevents access to our cultural legacy. Perhaps most 
perniciously, these policies also stifle content creation and hinder artistic abil-
ity to create. Lastly this Essay will explore the literature on optimal copyright 
term duration, and identify the divergence between the interests of content cre-
ators and content owners. To restore the original public meaning of copyright, 
copyright’s term must be shortened, and to do so we must reconsider existing 
international treaties on copyright and not sign any treaty that either would 
lock in existing terms or extend terms even longer.24 Finally, copyright terms 
must not be extended to “life plus 100” when the next copyright extension bill 
may come before Congress in 2018.25 
II. CONSTITUTIONAL COPYRIGHT 
James Madison and other Founders referred to copyrights and patents as 
forms of government-granted “monopoly.”26 Madison noted that the Constitu-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 24 See TRANS-PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENT DRAFT, ART. QQ.A.2 (2013), available 
at http://bit.ly/18vYho6; Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER 
FOUND., https://www.eff.org/issues/tpp (last visited Nov. 6, 2014). 
 25 See LESSIG, supra note 13, at 214. 
 26 Many in the content lobby relentlessly criticize the use of the term “monopoly” 
demonstrating just how disconnected their arguments are from an originalism-based analy-
sis. The Founders referred to copyright as a monopoly—this is a verifiable fact. For non-
originalist critique by copyright lobby, see Scott Cleland, The Copyright Education of Mr. 
Khanna—Part 2 Defending First Principles Series, PRECURSOR BLOG (Nov. 20, 2012, 
13:29), http://bit.ly/1AAhrrM 
Copyright is property not monopoly. [This terminology choice] is classic Lessig-ian 
buzzword blackmail to demonize ownership of private property by mischaracterizing 
property exclusive rights with a word he knows people don’t like – monopoly. . . . The 
only purpose in mischaracterizing property as a monopoly is to promote hostility to 
property and individual ownership of property separate from the state. 
Id. 
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tion had “limited them [monopolies] to two cases, the authors of Books, and of 
useful inventions.”27 Most importantly, Madison warned future generations that 
in “certain cases useful [monopolies like copyrights and patents] ought to be 
granted with caution, and guarded with strictness against abuse.”28 Madison 
was skeptical of monopolies, even overtly hostile; however, Madison argued 
that these two specific monopolies,29 for copyrights and patents, were justified 
because in these types of monopolies the benefits outweighed the “evil” since 
they provided an actual community “benefit” and are “temporary.”30 Madison 
concluded that “under that limitation, a sufficient [recompense] and encour-
agement may be given,” but reiterated that “perpetual monopolies of every 
sort, are forbidden not only by the genius of free [governments], but by the 
imperfection of human foresight.”31  
But importantly, and what seems to have been completely forgotten, Madi-
son didn’t just say that copyrights and patents are acceptable types of monopo-
ly provided by the government and the others were not, rather his statements 
made it clear that he perceived all monopolies to be dangerous, and he recog-
nized the dangers and costs associated with copyrights and patents upon socie-
ty and individual liberty.   
In Madison finding that copyrights and patents were justified, he added an 
ominous warning of their danger and specifically noted that these instruments 
must be carefully guarded against their “evil effect”: 
But grants of this sort can be justified in very peculiar cases only, if at all; the danger 
being very great that the good resulting from the operation of the monopoly, will be 
overbalanced by the evil effect of the precedent; and it being not impossible that the 
monopoly itself, in its original operation, may produce more evil than good.32 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
See Terry Hart, Republican Study Committee Policy Brief on Copyright: Part 1, COPYHYPE 
(Nov. 21, 2012), http://bit.ly/1zcsoCA. (“There is perhaps no more elementary and persis-
tent error in the history of copyright then the claim that it is a monopoly. And, just as persis-
tently, it has been debunked.”). 
 27 James Madison, Monopolies, Perpetuities, Corporations, Ecclesiastical Endowments, 
CONSTITUTION SOC’Y, http://www.constitution.org/jm/18191213_monopolies.htm (last vis-
ited Nov. 6, 2014) (drafted circa 1817-32, originally appearing as published in Harpers 
Magazine 494, March 1914). 
 28 Id. 
 29 See Thomas Jefferson to Isaac McPherson (Aug. 18, 1813), in UNIVERSITY OF  CHI-
CAGO THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 2000), avail-
able at press-pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/a1_8_8s12.html. 
 30 Madison, supra note 27. 
 31 Id. 
 32 Madison presciently warned that all monopolies, specifically the two provided in the 
Constitution for copyright and patents, must be “guarded with strictness [against] abuse.” 
Madison is specifically referring to various forms of monopolies here, including the state 
granting a monopoly to train operators, but he notes that the US Constitution only allows 
two monopolies so it seems like his comments here are directly applicable to both copy-
rights and patents as well as what he considered to be similar types of monopolies for train 
operators. See Madison, supra note 27. 
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Madison had reason to fear – he was speaking from historical experience. 
The Founders knew of abuses of monopolies by those with close connections 
to the king and knew that grants of monopoly were dangerous if left unre-
strained.33 These monopolies were one of the most dangerous powers granted 
to the government, because it was the state authorizing one entity to restrict the 
liberty of others, typically for purposes of monetary gain. Likely because of the 
Founders’ fear of this instrument being abused, they left future generations 
with extremely clear instructions on when these monopolies are appropriate, 
and with a specific limitation to enforce clear limits. In fact, of everything writ-
ten in the Constitution, the provisions for providing copyright and patents34 are 
structurally unique and explicit in a way that perhaps no other provisions of the 
Constitution are. 
According to the Constitution, Copyright law exists specifically “to 
[p]romote the progress of the sciences.”35 The Constitution tells us in stark, 
textually unique, language that is nearly as clear as the mandatory minimum 
age requirement for serving in Congress,36 how many Senators each state re-
ceives,37 how many states must ratify a Constitutional Amendment,38 and where 
bills that raise taxes must originate.39  
Of the 18 enumerated powers granted to Congress in Article I, Section 8, the 
power of Congress to provide copyright and patent monopolies is the only one 
with a stated purpose, “to promote the progress of science and useful arts.”40 
The Constitution does not tell us why or for what purposes the federal govern-
ment can regulate interstate commerce – which in retrospect could have been a 
useful limitation – and neither does it tell us for what purpose Congress can 
create an army and navy.41 As one law textbook describes it, the copy-
right/patent clause is the only clause with its own “built-in justification.”42 To a 
textualist, the fact that the Founders added a specific purpose for granting 
Congress this power must be given significant weight. Further, the Founders’ 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 33 Steven G. Calabresi & Larissa C. Leibowitz, Monopolies and the Constitution: A 
History of Crony Capitalism, 36 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 983, 1003 (2013). 
 34 Constitutional Law – Copyright Clause – Second Circuit Uphold Perpetual Anti-
Bootlegging Protection Against Copyright Clause Challenge, 121 HARV. L. REV. 1455, 1460 
(2007-2008). 
 35 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 36 Id. § 2, cl. 2. 
 37 Id. § 3, cl. 1. 
 38 U.S. CONST. art. V. 
 39 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. 
 40 Id., § 8, cl. 8. 
 41 See e.g., id. § 8, cl. 12-13 (does not specify that the army and navy are for defense 
and offensive operations as opposed to use domestically which would be addressed statuto-
rily through the Posse Comitatus Act years later). 
 42 JAMES BOYLE & JENNIFER JENKINS, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: LAW & THE INFOR-
MATION SOCIETY 39 (2014) http://web.law.duke.edu/cspd/pdf/IPCasebook2014.pdf. 
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restriction for copyright and patent terms, that they must be only for “limited 
times,”43 is also unique and specific.  
The Supreme Court has acknowledged that “[t]he Congress in the exercise 
of the patent power may not overreach the restraints imposed by the stated 
constitutional purpose.”44 Copyright laws, like the patent laws, “by constitu-
tional command”45 must promote the progress of the sciences and useful arts,46 
“[t]his is the standard expressed in the Constitution and it may not be ig-
nored.”47 
But as with other enumerated powers of the federal government, Congress 
has expanded copyright far beyond what was originally intended. Just as Con-
gress frequently neglects to abide by the Origination Clause and the Commerce 
Clause, it likewise has ignored the Copyright Clause’s requirement that these 
monopoly instruments be granted only for “limited times.”48 Despite Madison’s 
clear statement that “perpetual monopolies are forbidden,” under current poli-
cy, continually elongating copyright terms before they expire, one can come to 
the conclusion that a perpetual monopoly is effectively what copyright has be-
come.49  
Until 1976 Copyright terms were a limited, finite number of years, but after 
1976 copyright terms shifted to a term length that continues after the death of 
the creator. Through a similar regular extension of copyright terms, copyright 
has been, at least for the past several decades, a system of effectively infinite 
copyright terms.50 This distortion has been the result of the influence of a per-
sistent army of special interest lobbyists, usually representing media compa-
nies, rather than the interests of creators and the general public.51 
A. Presumptive Constitutionality 
Before one begins a substantive discussion on constitutional copyright, the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 43 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 44 Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kansas City, 383 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1966). 
 45 Id. at 6. 
 46 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 47 See Graham, 383 U.S. at 6 (the Court declined to extend this case in Golan v. Holder 
(2012)); see also Brief for The Am. Assoc. of Law Libraries, et al. as Amici Curiae Support-
ing Petitioners at 6, Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003). 
 48 Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 149, 186 (2003). 
 49 Michael Reddy, Supreme Court Hears Case on Copyright, Mickey Mouse and Con-
gress, AALL SPECTRUM MAG. 9 (Feb. 2003), http://bit.ly/1zHrXiE (“In the United States, 
we have perpetual copyright on the installment plan.”) (quoting Professor Peter Jaszi of 
American University’s Washington College of Law testimony before the US. Senate). 
 50 To be clear, this metaphor is solely designed to show the absurdity of the concept of 
limited times as applied here, not to draw any other form of comparison between copyright 
terms and prison sentences. 
 51 PATRY, supra note 4, at 6. 
62 Guarding Against Abuse [Vol. 23 
question of adjudication by the courts must first be addressed: if copyright pol-
icy is, as this Essay argues, so wildly divergent from the original public mean-
ing of the Founders, then why has the Supreme Court not acted? Further, why 
is restoring copyright to its original public meaning the business of Congress? 
The Court has held that acts of Congress are “presumptively constitution-
al.”52 And the presumption of constitutionality given to acts of Congress is 
“strong.” 53 As the Court explained in U.S. v. Five Gambling Devices, “this is 
not a mere polite gesture. It is a deference due to deliberate judgment by con-
stitutional majorities of the two Houses of Congress that an Act is within their 
delegated power or is necessary and proper to execution of that power.”54 This 
presumption, however, can create a vicious circle. To illustrate, Congress pre-
sumes the Supreme Court will be the final arbiter of constitutionality and then 
the Court defers to Congress, and with that, Congress assumes the measure to 
be constitutional, thereby never going through the process of substantively 
weighing the constitutionality of the legislation. Each branch must have a role 
in interpreting the Constitution,55 and while the Court may only strike down 
copyright terms that are infinite, Congress should only enact copyright terms 
that act for the stated purpose of the copyright clause, “to promote the progress 
of the sciences.”56  
But in the context of copyright in the past century, Congress has abdicated 
its role of ensuring their legislation on term length is constitutional, and no 
longer seriously considers whether copyright terms are consistent with the stat-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 52 Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC, 507 U.S. 1301, 1302 (1993). 
 53 United States v. Five Gambling Devices, 346 U.S. 441, 449 (1953). 
 54 Id. 
 55 In 2012, the House Republican Study Committee (“RSC”), a caucus representing 
over 170 members of the wing of the House Republicans, issued a report (authored by the 
author of this piece) on this topic that argued: 1) Assessing a law’s constitutionality is not, 
and should not be, the sole dominion of the judicial branch. All three branches were de-
signed to assess constitutionality… 2) Inaction by Congress can validate unconstitutional 
actions… 3) The Court may not be able to consider the constitutionality of all legislation 
because of questions of standing, ripeness, or a lack of bandwidth to hear all cases… 4) Just 
because the Supreme Court rules something as constitutional—or does not rule something as 
unconstitutional—does not mean that Congress can’t take subsequent action. DEREK KHAN-
NA, REPUBLICAN STUDY COMM., RSC POLICY BRIEF: CONGRESS’S ROLE AND RESPONSIBILITY 
IN DETERMINING THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF LEGISLATION 2-5 (2012) 
http://1.usa.gov/1wt4xwt 
Congress has a responsibility to ensure that its legislation is consistent and enabled by 
the Constitution, but it also must affirmatively act when other branches are violating 
the Constitution – so as to not validate these unconstitutional actions. Acts of Congress 
are. . . ‘presumptively constitutional’ under judicial review, which means that the Court 
assumes that Congress has deliberated on a law’s constitutionality. 
Id. 
 56 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
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ed aims of the copyright clause to “promote the progress of the sciences.”57 
Today, Congress must recognize that current copyright terms are vastly un-
moored from the original public meaning of the Copyright Clause, and in any 
case, poor public policy.58 
B. Guarding Against Abuse 
The Founders were very clear that copyright, as a form of monopoly, must 
be for only a limited duration. The U.S. Supreme Court has noted the framers’ 
“instinctive aversion to monopolies [and that it] was a monopoly on tea that 
sparked the Revolution.”59 Historians have cited “antimonopoly sentiments” as 
one of the roots of the struggle for American independence.60  Aversion to mo-
nopolies was so strong, that several of the original state constitutions even con-
tained provisions condemning the creation of monopolies.61 However, at least a 
few state laws provided express exceptions for copyright/patent types of mo-
nopolies.62 Massachusetts’ General Court’s Body of Liberties from 1641 stated 
“[n]o monopolies shall be granted or allowed amongst us, but of such new In-
ventions that are profitable to the Countrie, and that for a short time.”63 Con-
necticut passed a law in 1672, “[t]hat there shall be no Monopolies granted or 
allowed amongst us, but of such new Inventions as shall be judged profitable 
for the Country, and that for such time as the General Court shall judge 
meet.”64 
It is against this backdrop, of distinct aversion to monopoly (or at least most 
forms), that one must interpret the Copyright Clause. The temporal limitation 
and the specific purpose were clearly of importance to the Founders and, ac-
cording to Edward Walterscheid’s account, attendees at the ratifying conven-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 57 Id. 
 58 See JERRY BRITO ET AL., COPYRIGHT UNBALANCED: FROM INCENTIVE TO EXCESS 9 
(Nov. 12, 2012). 
 59 Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kansas City, 383 U.S. 1, 7 (1966). 
 60 THEODORE. P. KOVALEFF, THE ANTITRUST IMPULSE: AN ECONOMIC, HISTORICAL, AND 
LEGAL ANALYSIS 5 (M.E. Sharpe, Inc., Vol. I 1994). 
 61 See MD. CONST. OF 1776, art. XXXIX (“[M]onopolies are odious, contrary to the 
spirit of free government, and the principles of commerce...and ought not be suffered.”); See 
N.C. CONST. OF 1776, art. XXIII (“That perpetuities and monopolies are contrary to the ge-
nius of a free state, and ought not be allowed.”). 
 62 See Terry Hart, Myths From the Birth of US Copyright: Part 2, COPYHYPE (May 17, 
2012), http://bit.ly/1DRuY3L. 
 63 See id.; The Massachusetts Body of Liberties, HANOVER HIST. TEXTS PROJECT, 
http://history.hanover.edu/texts/masslib.html (last updated Mar. 8, 2012) (digital scan of Old 
South Leaflets Circa 1900 pages 261-80, scanned by Monica Banas in August, 1996). 
 64 Hart, supra note 62 (quoting from THE LAWS OF CONNETICUT: AN EXACT REPRINT OF 
THE ORIGINAL EDITION OF 1673). 
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tions shared fears of monopoly abuse.65 Many states proposed amendments 
indicating their opposition to any further congressional power to establish mo-
nopolies.66  
Until the early 20th century, there was a general consensus on a limited cop-
yright and Congress generally abided by the original public meaning of the 
Copyright Clause.67 A 1909 report from the Senate Committee on Patents (S. 
9440) “to amend and consolidate acts respecting copyright” notes that certain 
legislation would be beyond the power of Congress.68 
The bill report stated that copyright law is “not primarily for the benefit for 
the author, but primarily for the benefit of the public.”69According to the re-
port, “Congress must consider...two questions: [f]irst, how much will the legis-
lation stimulate the producer and so benefit the public; and, second, how much 
will the monopoly granted be detrimental to the public.”70 Congress must use 
copyright to confer “a benefit upon the public that outweighs the evils of the 
temporary monopoly.”71 This report was consistent with a large amount of evi-
dence of our historical tradition.72 
The Supreme Court has chosen to not directly strike down continual copy-
right term extension, and they have deferred determining appropriate copyright 
terms to Congress. However, their holdings have, at times, clearly enunciated a 
similar understanding of the history of copyright.73 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 65 Edward C. Walterscheid, To Promote the Progress of Science and Useful Arts: The 
Anatomy of a Congressional Power, 43 IDEA J. OF L. & TECH. 1, 6 (2003). 
 66 Id. 
 67 Copyright Timeline: A History of Copyright in the United States, ASS’N OF RES. 
LIBR., http://bit.ly/1wTB4ub (last visited Nov. 6, 2014). 
 68 COMM. ON PATENTS, TO AMEND AND CONSOLIDATE ACTS RESPECTING COPYRIGHT, 
H.R. REP. NO. 2222, at 6-7 (1909) 
The object of all legislation must be...to promote science and the useful arts...[T]he 
spirit of any act which Congress is authorized to pass must be one which will promote 
the progress of sciences and the useful arts, and unless it is designed to accomplish this 
result and is believed, in fact, to accomplish this result, it would be beyond the power 
of Congress. 
Id. 
 69 Id. at 7. 
 70 Id. 
 71 Id. 
 72 See Madison, supra note 27; see also Copyright Timeline, supra note 67. 
 73 See Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 431-32 (1984) 
The limited scope of the copyright holder’s statutory monopoly, like the limited copy-
right duration required by the Constitution, reflects a balance of competing claims upon 
the public interest: Creative work is to be encouraged and rewarded, but private moti-
vation must ultimately serve the cause of promoting broad public availability of litera-
ture, music and the other arts. The immediate effect of our copyright law is to secure a 
fair return for an “author’s” creative labor. But the ultimate aim is, by this incentive, to 
stimulate artistic creativity for the general public good. 
Id. 
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The Sony decision also cited Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, in which the Court 
explained: “The sole interest of the United States and the primary object in 
conferring the monopoly lie in the general benefits derived by the public from 
the labors of authors.”74 Most directly on this point, as Justice Ginsburg men-
tioned during oral arguments for the Eldred case, “there has to be a lim-
it...[p]erpetual copyright is not permitted.”75  
The Founders understood the limit to be very short, economists argue that it 
must be short, but the copyright lobby doesn’t want any limit at all and they 
have succeeded in their goal of continually enlarging copyright terms to elimi-
nate their expiration.76 
III. THE COPYRIGHT LOBBY 
In recent decades, a number of special interests that some conservative ac-
tivists collectively dubbed the “copyright lobby”77 have tirelessly worked to 
keep their copyrighted works from entering the public domain by continually 
elongating the term of copyrights. The public policy goals of the copyright 
inflation movement have been to undermine the Constitution’s text and its 
original public meaning.78 The recapture of works that would be in the public 
domain represents one of the biggest thefts of “property” in history, and has 
had significant economic impacts upon our culture, personal liberty and econ-












	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 74 Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 127 (1932). 
 75 Transcript of Oral Argument at 29-30, Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003) (No. 
01-618), 2002 WL 31309203. 
 76 Copyright Extremists Shouldn’t Control Information, supra note 10. 
 77 Id. 
 78 Id. 
 79 Ian Hargreaves, Digital Opportunity: A Review of Intellectual Property and Growth, 
U.K. INTELL. PROP. OFF. 1, 3, 10 (May 2011), http://www.ipo.gov.uk/ipreview-
finalreport.pdf. 
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The copyright for 1928’s “Steamboat Willie,” which introduced the world to 
Mickey Mouse, was extended by both the 1976 and 1998 amendments to the 
Copyright Act. It currently is set to expire in 2023. 
SOURCE: Tom W. Bell80 
 
Current U.S. law provides copyright protection for the life of the author plus 
seventy years.81 For corporate authors, the term is 120 years after creation or 
ninety-five years after publication.82 But those changes reflect only part of the 
reality. In fact, lobbyists have usurped the policy-making process itself to en-
sure that whenever one term of copyright is set to expire, the law is extended 
again to make terms even longer.83  Several times, these extensions have even 
been made retroactively,84 re-applying copyright protections to works that al-
ready had moved into the public domain. Thus, the degree to which the current 
“life plus seventy” standard can be relied upon to accurately project when a 
specific work may move into the public domain is quite limited. The practical 
effect of this policy has been over the past three decades, effectively, a regime 
of indefinite copyright.85 During oral arguments of the 2002 case of Eldred v. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 80 Tom W. Bell, Copyright Duration and the Mickey Mouse Curve, AGORAPHILIA (Aug. 
5, 2009), http://bit.ly/1C8KCpK. 
 81 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (2012). 
 82 Id. § 302(c). 
 83 See e.g., Bell, supra note 80 (discussing Steamboat Willie). 
 84 Copyright Term Extension Act, Pub.L. No.105-298, 112 Stat. 2828; Copyright Act of 
1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2573. 
 85 Jeff John Roberts, Will Copyright Be Extended 20 More Years? An Old Debate Re-
turns, GIGAOM (Aug. 20, 2013), http://gigaom.com/2013/08/20/will-copyright-be-extended-
20-more-years-an-old-debate-returns/. 
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Ashcroft, Justice Sandra Day O’Connor acknowledged that infinite copyright 
extension “flies directly in the face of what the framers had in mind, absolute-
ly.”86  
Jack Valenti, then-head of the Motion Picture Academy of America 
(“MPAA”), testified during the legislative run-up to passage of the 1998’s 
Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act (known colloquially as the “Mick-
ey Mouse Protection Act”)87 that “copyright term extension has a simple but 
compelling enticement: it is very much in America’s economic interests.”88 
What is the logical extension of this argument? If, according to the MPAA, 
copyright term extension to life plus fifty is “in America’s economic interests,” 
and copyright term extensions to life plus seventy, is again “in America’s eco-
nomic interests” then why would the United States not extend copyright to 800 
years; further, how does one reconcile the Founders inclusion of “limited 
times” at all with this concept? When Valenti says this is in “America’s eco-
nomic interests” which portion of America is he referring to – does it help big 
Hollywood studios with large content portfolios rake in more rents for longer? 
Or does it help content creators create more? “America’s economic interests” 
is an extremely vague concept, but the operative question, according to the 
Constitution, is instead how does a particular policy best “promote the progress 
of the sciences and useful arts”89 – the Constitution says nothing about promot-
ing economic interests for one interest group. Further, despite such assertions, 
the MPAA has produced no credible research to back up the claim that extend-
ing copyright terms is in the U.S. economic interest, while evidence to the con-
trary is overwhelming.90  
The extension of copyright, particular to life plus fifty under the Berne Con-
vention, is a direct result of importing foreign law with lobbyists arguing for 
“international harmonization.”91   As UCLA History Professor Peter Baldwin’s 
new book The Copyright Wars: Three Centuries of Trans-Atlantic Battle ex-
plains, “[c]opyright’s evolution is often told as a story of American cultural 
hegemony. In fact, the opposite is more plausible. . . the abolition of formali-
ties, the extension of terms, and most fundamentally, the shift of copyright’s 
philosophical underpinnings from statute back towards natural rights. . . British 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 86 Transcript of Oral Argument at 18, Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003) (No. 01-
618), available at http://www.aaronsw.com/2002/eldredTranscript. 
 87 Roberts, supra note 85. 
 88 Copyright Term, Film Labeling, and Film Preservation Legislation: Hearing on H.R. 
989, H.R. 1248, H.R. 1734 Before the Subcommittee on Courts and Intellectual Property of 
the Committee on the Judiciary, House of Representative, 104th Cong. 50 (1995) (statement 
of Jack Valenti, President and CEO, Motion Picture Association of America) (Hereinafter 
Hearing on H.R. 989, H.R. 1248, H.R. 1734). 
 89 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 90 Hearing on H.R. 989, H.R. 1248, H.R. 1734, supra note 88 at 111. 
 91 Id. at 618. 
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and American law bowed to their content industries.”92 
When the idea of international harmonization was first presented in the 
United States, in the 19th century,93 Congress wisely chose not to disregard the 
Constitution’s original public meaning of copyright.94 Samuel Clemens (known 
as Mark Twain) testified before Congress in favor of longer copyright terms 
and importing international law and claimed, “I know that we must have that 
limit. But forty-two years is too much of a limit. I do not know why there 
should be a limit at all. . .[however] this limit is quite satisfactory to me—for 
the author’s life, and fifty years after.”95 
Congress rejected Mark Twain’s arguments for international harmonization 
for life plus fifty as would be required in the 1908 version of the Berne Con-
vention (Berlin Act of 1908).96 Twain also argued that copyright was his natu-
ral right property, something that the Founders rejected.97 Twain argued that 
there was no real negative effect of perpetual copyright because so few works 
retain any commercial value after the original short copyright term would have 
expired.98 Therefore, the public loses little because it was likely unavailable 
anyways at that point. Twain was clearly mistaken, and with new technology, 
his comments are clearly incorrect for the modern economy.  
But despite Mark Twain’s stature and influence, he was not able to convince 
Congress to shake off its adherence to constitutional considerations of copy-
right in 1906.99 Approximately seventy years later, however, interest groups 
would become sufficiently powerful to convince Congress to disregard much 
of constitutional copyright and incorporate an international perspective on 
copyright that is vastly larger in scope and length than the Founders’ concep-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 92 PETER BALDWIN, THE COPYRIGHT WARS: THREE CENTURIES OF TRANS-ATLANTIC 
BATTLE, 260-261 (2014). 
 93 Hearing on H.R. 989, H.R. 1248, H.R. 1734, supra note 88 at 158, 164-65. 
 94 Congress would pass the Copyright Act of 1909 Pub. L No. 60-349 35 Stat. 1075 
(repealed in 1978) (1909), that allowed for copyrighted works to be copyrighted for 28 
years, with a renewal of 28 years, but rejected Mark Twain’s plea for life plus fifty or infi-
nite copyright. Congress also kept the requirements that Copyrighted works have a notice of 
copyright. 
 95 Mark Twain on the Need for Perpetual Copyright, THE PUB. DOMAIN (Sept. 9, 2014), 
http://bit.ly/13IHLWv. 
 96 Id. 
 97 Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. 591, 661 (1834). Congress, in passing the act of 1790, did 
not legislate in reference to existing rights, appears clear, from the provision that the author, 
&c. ‘shall have the sole right and liberty of printing,’ &c. Now if this exclusive right existed 
at common law, and congress were about to adopt legislative provisions for its protection, 
would they have used this language? Could they have deemed it necessary to vest a right 
already vested. Such a presumption is refuted by the words above quoted, and their force is 
not lessened by any other part of the act. Id. 
 98 Mark Twain on the Need for Perpetual Copyright, supra note 95. 
 99 See generally The Copyright Act of 1909 Pub. L No. 60-349 35 Stat. 1075 (repealed 
in 1978) (1909). 
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tion of copyright.100  
Given the historical moorings of short copyright terms, the onus is on spe-
cial interest groups like the Recording Industry Association of America (RI-
AA) and the MPAA to substantiate their arguments for copyright terms that 
deviate wildly from our founding tradition.  There is no consistency between 
copyright terms of fourteen years, and copyright terms longer than the author 
could be alive for – those are essentially two different types of monopolies.  
The RIAA and MPAA also “do not know why there should be a limit at all” 
and have advocated from that perspective.101 Their vested interest is obvious, 
they believe they can make more money from keeping their copyrights forever, 
but one special interest group’s vested financial incentive shouldn’t be the only 
one that Congress hears from or legislates on the basis of – as will be shown in 
this piece, particularly in the context of copyright terms lengths, it is the only 
voice heard. Based on the constitutional text, these interest groups must answer 
logical questions like how do copyright terms of life plus seventy years, apply-
ing to everything from books and movies to Facebook messages, “promote the 
progress of the sciences and useful arts?”102 
But instead of substantive arguments for perpetual copyright term extension, 
the MPAA has forwarded claims that bear striking resemblance to their out-
landish predictions of doom and gloom that accompanied introduction of the 
video-cassette recorder, which the MPAA worked to ban through both legisla-
tion and litigation.103 In 1982, Valenti told Congress:  
… [W]e cannot live in a marketplace...where there is one unleashed animal [the VCR] 
in that marketplace, unlicensed. It would no longer be a marketplace; it would be a 
kind of a jungle, where this one unlicensed instrument is capable of devouring all that 
people had invested in…We are going to bleed and hemorrhage, unless this Congress 
at least protects [our industry against the VCR]… I say to you that the VCR is to the 
American film producer and the American public as the Boston strangler is to the 
woman home alone.104 
Track records matter when the same interest groups now make similar 
claims going forward on what will happen with shorter copyright terms. And 
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ment of Jack Valenti, President, Motion Picture Association of America, Inc.). 
70 Guarding Against Abuse [Vol. 23 
the track record is not good: we have the data to test Jack Valenti’s statements, 
and he was not just a little wrong, he couldn’t have been more incorrect on the 
market impact. Just two years after the 1984 Supreme Court decision in which 
the MPAA lost its suit to ban the VCR, revenues from video tape sales and 
rentals were $4.38 billion, eclipsing 1986’s box office revenues of $3.78 bil-
lion.105 In 2012, the home media consumption market that the MPAA tried to 
stamp out blossomed into an $18 billion dollar market.106 
Policymakers should be highly skeptical – the same industry lobbyists,107 
who claim that longer copyright terms are in our national interest, have a track 
record of grossly incorrect predictions filled with scare tactics, and fail to pro-
vide substantive data to argue in their favor.  
While the MPAA and RIAA have never really articulated strong economic 
arguments for continual renewal of copyright terms, we do know the steep 
costs to perpetual extension of copyright – those will be documented here.  
Costs of perpetual copyright have been known for centuries, which is why the 
British copyright statute of 1710, the Statute of Anne,108 limited copyright dura-
tion to fourteen years; why twelve of the original thirteen colonies had similar 
copyright durations in their own statutes; why the Constitution includes the 
phrase “limited times”; and why the Founders limited copyright to fourteen 
years.109 
IV. COSTS OF EXCESSIVE COPYRIGHT DURATION FAR EXCEED 
THE LIKELY BENEFITS  
As a result of extremely long copyright terms and unclear fair use laws, we 
have clear evidence that, rather than serving as an incentive to create, exces-
sively long copyright – well beyond what the Founders would support – actual-
ly hinders creation. New artists, directors and writers are unable to create de-
rivative works without paying fees that can be so high as to make the cost of 
derivative works prohibitive or even impossible.110 In a brief submitted during 
the Eldred case, Nobel laureates Milton Friedman, Ronald Coase, James Bu-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 105 Khanna, supra note 103. 
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chanan, George Akerlof, Kenneth Arrow and eleven other economists argued 
that a “lengthened copyright term...keeps additional materials out of new crea-
tors’ hands” and ultimately results in “fewer new works” and “higher transac-
tion costs in the creation of some works.”111 The economists argued that the 
1998 extension is inefficient and “reduces consumer welfare,” as consumers 
are denied the ability to acquire derivative works and content that otherwise 
would be in the public domain.112 
In fact, even John Locke, often touted by content industry proponents as the 
basis for their arguments for copyright extension,113 recognized the harm of 
excessively long copyright terms, he simply disagreed on what was excessively 
long. John Locke was opposed to the copyright statute of his day,114 and during 
the debate on the Licensing Act of 1693, he wrote a letter to MP Edward 
Clarke115 arguing, “This I am sure, it is very absurd and ridiculous that any now 
living should pretend to have property in, or a power to dispose of, the proprie-
ty of any copy or writings of authors who lived before printing was known or 
used in Europe.”116 Locke went on to argue, “That any person or company 
should have patents for the sole printing of ancient authors is very unreasona-
ble and injurious to learning….”117 
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 115 Id. at 556. 
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To be clear, Locke was in favor of very long copyright – he was in favor of 
either fifty-year copyright terms,118 or if the work was bought by a publisher, in 
favor of terms of life of the author plus fifty or life plus seventy terms119 – but 
even Locke recognized that perpetual copyright was detrimental. The Founders 
were generally familiar with the work of John Locke, although it’s less clear if 
they were specifically aware of Locke’s work on copyright, and they seem to 
also have agreed that allowing any person to have a monopoly for “ancient 
authors” is “unreasonable and injurious to learning,” but while Locke was ad-
vocating for a long copyright term, the British and then the Founders explicitly 
rejected this position, seemingly finding that the effects that Locke was wor-
ried about manifested themselves sooner than life of the author plus fifty years, 
as quickly as fourteen years.120 
Modern data establishes that Locke correctly recognized that perpetual cop-
yright was detrimental to learning and content creation – but that Locke’s pre-
scription for optimal copyright was much too long for achieving a proper bal-
ance between interests to “promote the progress of the sciences and useful 
arts.”121 This is what the British and Founders thought even in the 18th century, 
as while Locke was arguing for life plus fifty/seventy copyright, the British 
chose fourteen years.122 The Founders’ explicit rejection of Lockean style copy-
right (particularly in the context of term length, but also in what is copyrighta-
ble), makes it particularly egregious, and intellectually dishonest, that today the 
content industry uses John Locke for the basis of many of their talking 
points.123  
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Despite the content industries obsession with using Locke to argue their 
case, even John Locke recognized the importance of a balance between at least 
two interests, one the interests of providing a sufficient incentive to create, 
market, disseminate and improve/invest in content and two, the interests of 
everyone else, from the general public to other content creators; Locke just 
believed this balance was found at a much longer term.124  Lord Mansfield125 
explained this balance well over 200 years ago:  
[W]e must take care to guard against two extremes equally prejudicial; the one, that 
men of ability, who have employed their time for the service of the community, may 
not be deprived of their just merits, and the reward of their ingenuity and labour; the 
other, that the world may not be deprived of improvements, nor the progress of the 
arts be retarded.126  
Acknowledging the cost of excessively long copyright, while praising the 
benefit of copyright existing, as the Founders did, is critical to understanding 
why copyright must expire – not merely because that is what the Constitution 
prescribes, but because it is good policy.127  
A. Restricting Individual Liberty  
The Founders understood well the costs of keeping older content behind a 
locked vault affects creativity in a number of ways, but in addition these mo-
nopolies restrict individual liberty.128 Copyrights and patents have their origins 
in the British crown’s policy of granting to chosen benefactors exclusive mo-
nopolies for creation of certain common products.129 Such monopolies unques-
tionably were recognized as restricting freedom.130  
Copyrights and patents continue to act, in some ways, as restrictions upon 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Locke’s term lengths. See Hughes, supra note 114, at 559. 
 124 Id. 
 125 Chief Justice William Murray, 1st Earl of Mansfield is more commonly known as 
“Lord Mansfield.” Lord Mansfield was appointed to the King’s Bench in 1756 and served 
until 1788. He was known for his valuable contributions to legal field, particularly in com-
mercial law. See William Murray, 1st earl of Mansfield, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, 
http://bit.ly/1wt93em (last visited Sept. 10, 2014). 
 126 Cary v. Longman, 102 Eng. Rep. 138, 140 n. (b) (1801) (citing Sayre v. Moore, 102 
Eng. Rep. 139,140 (K.B. 1785)). 
 127 See Why Disney Has Clout with the Republican Congress, supra note 10. 
 128 Randolph J. May & Seth L. Cooper, Perspectives from FSF Scholars Vol. 8, No. 20 – 
The Constitution’s Approach to Copyright: Anti-Monopoly, Pro-Intellectual Property 
Rights, FREE STATE FOUND. 2-3 (Aug. 26, 2013), http://bit.ly/1w62F7y. 
 129 See Dinusha Mendis, The Historical Development of Exceptions to Copyright and Its 
Application to Copyright Law in the Twenty-first Century, 7.5 ELECTRONIC J. OF COMP. L. 
(Nov. 2003), available at http://www.ejcl.org/ejcl/75/art75-8.html (“…[I]n 1709 the British 
Parliament produced the most significant breakthrough in the history of copyright law and 
introduced the first piece of copyright legislation in the world […].”). 
 130 Id. 
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creation, speech and personal liberty.131 Under the Constitution, those re-
strictions are justified on grounds that they are necessary to provide incentives 
for creative genius, but they remain restrictions nonetheless.132  By conception, 
copyright’s restriction on personal liberty may sometimes be justified and nec-
essary to enforce the statutorily created property rights ability to monetize 
properly, such as restrictions on bootlegging CD’s or on selling books written 
by another, but in the extreme these same policies often have effects that are 
much more pernicious and difficult to justify. 
As one clear illustration of the costs of extremely long copyright, recently 
Warner/Chappell has claimed a copyright to “Happy Birthday to You,”133 
which the Guinness World Records book calls the most famous song in the 
English language.134 Their copyright claim is based upon a published version of 
piano arrangements from 1935.135 Warner/Chappell is a major record label rep-
resenting Madonna and Michael Jackson’s estate, not a fly by night opera-
tion.136 So far they have collected an estimated over $2 million a year in licens-
ing fees from thousands of people that they have forced to pay licensing fees.137 
According to one estimate, it is the song that earns the highest royalty rates.138 
Every time someone wants to use a portion of this song in a movie, televi-
sion program, or stage performance they have to pay a license fee or risk being 
sued.139 And this is also true for “public performances” which would generally 
include the music played at restaurants and sports arenas, which require a li-
cense.140  It has been reported that restaurants such as Applebee’s and Shoney’s 
have developed songs that are used instead of “Happy Birthday to You” to 
avoid copyright infringement and avoid paying hefty royalties.141 This is a cost 
that our society bears, not being able to hear the song that individuals prefer to 
hear. Under current copyright law, “Happy Birthday to You” will remain under 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 131 Tom W. Bell, Copyright as Intellectual Property Privilege, 57 SYRACUSE L. REV. 
523, 529-30 (2007). 
 132 Id. at 526-27. 
 133 NY Suit Filed Over Copyright to ‘Happy Birthday to You,’ World’s Most Famous 
English Song, STAR TRIBUNE, http://strib.mn/13kKRz9 (last updated June 13, 2013). 
 134 Id. 
 135 Id. 
 136 Id. 
 137 Robert Brauneis, Copyright and the World’s Most Popular Song. 56 J. COPYRIGHT 
SOCIETY U.S.A. 335 (2009), available at http://bit.ly/1JgFWQp. 
 138 Mike Masnick, Lawsuit Filed to Prove Happy Birthday Is In the Public Domain; 
Demands Warner Pay Back Millions of License Fees, TECHDIRT (July 13, 2013), 
http://bit.ly/1yVTwDE. 
 139 Id.; See Licensing Help, ASCAP, 
http://www.ascap.com/licensing/licensingfaq.aspx#general. 
 140 Masnick, supra note 138; See Licensing Help, supra note 139. 
 141 Rose Desrochers, The Song Happy Birthday to You is Protected by Copyright, 
STREET DIRECTORY, http://bit.ly/1AAm1WN (last visited Oct. 8. 2014). 
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copyright until 2030, but we should expect a potential push to continue to ex-
pand copyright even further beyond 2030.142  
However, the authenticity of the copyright claim from 1935 is itself under 
dispute, with others arguing that the song was written earlier and by someone 
else.143 Robert Brauneis of The George Washington University Law School 
argued persuasively that Warner/Chappell does not own a lawful copyright to 
this song, but while the Court tries to sort this out, people will have to pay 
rents to Warner/Chappell to publicly perform the most famous song in the 
English language.144 This will discourage some people from performing this 
song publicly, and it does so for no cognizable reason.  
B. Limiting Historical Works 
Eyes on the Prize145 is one of the most important documentaries on the civil 
rights movement. But many potential younger viewers have never seen it, in 
part because license requirements for photographs and archival music make it 
incredibly difficult to rebroadcast.146 The director, Jon Else, has said “it’s not 
clear that anyone could even make ‘Eyes on the Prize’ today because of rights 
clearances.”147  The problems facing Eyes on the Prize are a result of muddied 
and unclear case law on fair use, but also copyright terms that have been great-
ly expanded.  If copyright terms were fourteen years, as they were in 1790,148 
then the rights to short video clips for many of these historical events would be 
in the public domain.  
Excessively long copyright terms help explain why Martin Luther King’s I 
Have a Dream speech is rarely shown on television, and specifically why it is 
almost never shown in its entirety in any other form.149  In 1999, CBS was sued 
for using portions of the speech in a documentary.150 But if copyright terms 
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 143 G.F., The Economist explains: Why are the rights to “Happy Birthday in dispute?, 
ECONOMIST (Jun. 16, 2013, 11:50 PM), http://econ.st/1sOMX6e. 
 144 Bruneis, supra note 137, at 389-90. 
 145 Eyes on the Prize (PBS television broadcast Jan. 21, 1997). 
 146 See Copyright Issues Block Broadcast of Award-Winning Civil Rights Documentary 
“Eyes on the Prize,” DEMOCRACY NOW! (Feb. 8, 2005), ), http://bit.ly/1v8ffUy; see also 
American Experience: Eyes on the Prize: About the TV Series, PUBLIC BROADCASTING SER-
VICE (PBS) (Aug. 23, 2006), 
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/amex/eyesontheprize/about/index.html. 
 147 Nancy Ramsey, The Secret Cost of Documentaries, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 16, 2005, at 
A23. 
 148 Copyright Act of 1790, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 124 (1790) (repealed 1909). 
 149 Lauren Williams, I Have a Copyright: The Problem With MLK’s Speech, MOTHER 
JONES (Aug. 23, 2013 5:00 AM), http://bit.ly/1itaHm1. 
 150 Estate of Martin Luther King, Jr., Inc. v. CBS, Inc., 194 F.3d 1211, 1212-13 (11th 
Cir. 1999). 
76 Guarding Against Abuse [Vol. 23 
were shorter than fifty years, then those clips would be available for anyone to 
show on television, in a documentary or to students.  
When historical clips are in the public domain – learning flourishes. Martin 
Luther King did not need the promise of copyright protection for “life plus 
seventy years” to motivate him to write the I Have a Dream speech. He wrote 
the speech because of the March on Washington and because he hoped to in-
spire Congress to pass civil rights legislation. King gave the speech for politi-
cal reasons and for historical value. He wanted it to be quoted and to inspire 
future generations – and he clearly succeeded.151 
Yet today, generations of schoolchildren are denied the ability to watch this 
speech, a clear abuse of the intent for copyright to promote “the progress of 
science and the useful arts.”152 Furthermore, King’s speech itself built upon 
other works, referencing the Bible, the Gettysburg Address, My Country, Tis of 
Thee and William Shakespeare.153 The speech would not exist, at least not in 
any form recognizable to us, without the ability to build on the works of others 
but now generations after him are often unable to build upon his masterpiece. 
Generations of these historical artifacts now lay fallow behind locked vaults of 
copyright. 
C. Increasing Transaction Costs 
Judge Richard Posner has called the perpetual lengthening of copyright 
terms “the most serious problem with copyright law.”154 As Posner notes, the 
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point today where students can’t access the speech because of costs, this is clearly not what 
he would have intended. Any financial benefit from the speech was surely ancillary. 
See also Mark Leiser, King of Copyright: On the 50th anniversary of ‘I have a dream’, Mar-
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http://bit.ly/1zF30TM. 
 152 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 153 Vera Chan & Max Zimbert, The Inspirations Behind “I Have a Dream,” YAHOO! 
NEWS (Aug. 28, 2013, 5:29 AM), http://yhoo.it/1zHzga2; see Rev. Martin Luther King, Jr., 
Keynote Address at the Wash., D.C. Civil Right March: I Have A Dream (Aug. 28, 1968). 
 154 Posner, supra note 10; Posner explains some of the problems with the extension: 
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costs may be prohibitive if creators of new intellectual property must obtain licenses to 
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tracing costs may be a significant barrier.155 The tracing costs occur because it’s 
difficult to figure out whether works are in the public domain or under copy-
right and, if under copyright, whom to contact and the price to license the 
work.156  Works published before 1923 are in the public domain,157 but works 
between 1923 and 1964 are in a potential grey area, often depending on wheth-
er the author renewed the copyright.158 The only official records of renewal are 
held by the Copyright Office in Washington, DC; however, records before 
1978 are not available online.159 So in order to license a photograph, movie, or 
book from before 1978, you may have to go to the Copyright Office in person 
and research using the paper card catalogs or pay the copyright office $165 an 
hour to search the record.160 Once one figures out who registered the work, 
when it was filed, and if it was renewed, it may still be legally complex to de-
termine if it is under copyright or in the public domain. Cornell161 helped by 
putting together a complicated chart to help determine the status of a work, but 
as one of the creators of the chart for Cornell explains “[e]ven with the chart in 
hand, it is impossible to determine absolutely the scope of the public domain in 
the U.S. or to say with 100% certainty that a work has risen into the public 
domain.”162 Therefore, he wrote a 3600 word guide to supplement the chart to 
help decide if a work is in the public domain or not.163 This is legal complexity 
assuming that one knows all the facts like who the lawful owner is of the work 
and when and where it was registered. This lack of clarity in the law itself in-
creases the transaction costs further. 
D. Creating Orphan Works Epidemic 
The mass epidemic of “orphan works” is largely a result of excessively long 
copyright terms,164 and demonstrates how copyright can act as a restraint on 
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PROPERTY LAW 213 (Belknap Press, 1st ed., 2003). 
 155 Id. 
 156 R Street Policy Study No. 20, supra note 6, at 10. 
 157 Id. 
 158 Teri Karobonik, The Public Domain: Now Available for Only $165 An Hour, TECH 
DIRT (July 16, 2013), http://bit.ly/1wTFWQ2. 
 159 R Street Policy Study No. 20, supra note 6, at 10. 
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 161 See Copyright Term and the Public Domain in the United States, CORNELL UNIV. 
(Jan. 1, 2014), http://copyright.cornell.edu/resources/publicdomain.cfm. 
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personal liberty and content creation.165 Orphan works arise when the rights 
holder for a work is not apparent and it’s either too expensive or, indeed, im-
possible to determine who is entitled to compensation.166 The prevalence of 
orphan works creates a number of problems for the content industry.167 If you 
can’t track down who owns rights in the work, you can’t use the work.168  
This problem was nearly nonexistent when copyright terms were shorter, 
and when it required formalities, but the perpetual extension of copyright has 
rendered large quantities of content un-reproducible.169 It means those videos, 
books and music effectively are off limits to society, while the heirs to those 
works receive nothing. It’s a policy nightmare that hurts everyone, including 
interests the copyright lobby claims to represent. It is also a clear demonstra-
tion of how copyright policy limits personal liberty, when individuals can’t 
reproduce or remix these works for any price.  
This self-inflicted wound has real-world consequences.170 As the Copyright 
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 168 See U.S. REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS, supra note 166 
Many users of copyrighted works have indicated that the risk of liability for copyright 
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not locatable because he no longer exists or otherwise does not care to restrain the use 
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Id. 
 169 Orphan Works, 70 Fed. Reg. 3739, 3742 (2005). 
 170 See, e.g., PATRY, supra note 4, at 190 (“The BBC has 1 million hours of programming 
in its archives that are unusable because the rights holders are unknown…”); see, e.g., HER 
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Office concluded in 2006, “legislation is necessary to provide a meaningful 
solution to the orphan works problem as we know it today.”171 The legislation 
that would best fix the problem is to have significantly shorter copyright 
terms.172 In 2012, the Library of Congress, while noting the arguments in favor 
of copyright extension, explained that “extend[ing] the duration of copy-
right…increased the likelihood that some copyright owners would become 
unlocatable.”173 And the “net result” of copyright extension “has been that 
more and more copyright owners may go missing.”174 
The issue of orphan works likely would have been alien to the Founders. In 
addition to the much shorter fourteen-year term, copyrights originally had to be 
deposited in the District Court for the jurisdiction of the proprietor, and then 
with the Office of the Secretary of State, who would keep a copy.175 While the 
Founders allowed copyright holders one renewal term, for a maximum term of 
twenty-eight years, without an affirmative action to renew, a work would au-
tomatically enter the public domain.176 Thus, every work that could be under 
copyright would have had a paper trail to track down, at most fourteen years 
out of date, and there could be no debate on which works were under copyright 
or who the rights holder was. 
As the Library of Congress explained, the status quo where millions of 
works cannot be used because the owner cannot be identified or located is a 
state of affairs, as a result of current copyright policy, directly contradicts the 
constitutional purpose of copyright: “to promote the [p]rogress of [s]cience.”177  
E. Depressing Volume of Publicly Available Content 
The copyright lobby sometimes counters that a “public domain work is an 
orphan.”178 The previous head of the MPAA, Jack Valenti, explained that, in 
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regard to public domain works, “[n]o one is responsible for its life. But every-
one exploits its use, until that time certain when it becomes soiled and haggard, 
barren of its previous virtues.”179 The head of the RIAA explains that “there is 
all but zero value to a record company in a public domain recording.”180 The 
Institute for Policy Information, an MPAA-funded organization,181 offered in a 
recent blog post on its website that: 
[T]he public domain is, in fact, a vast wasteland where a modest number of public 
works remain in circulation, but where almost everything disappears into obscurity, 
because the loss of ownership and control means no one any longer has any incentive 
to promote the distribution of the works or to popularize them.182 
In their brief before the Supreme Court, the Nashville Songwriters Associa-
tion went even further, arguing that the public domain is nothing more than 
“legal piracy.”183 Considering the Founders’ copyright regime had a fourteen-
year term, required registration and didn’t apply to foreign works, that’s an 
awful lot of “legal piracy” they permitted.184 If the logical extension of a spe-
cial interest group’s argument is that the Founders were “pirates” then perhaps 
academics should be skeptical of such a claim – particularly because their 
claims are a testable hypothesis. 
Further, these groups have a track record of disinformation and their claim 
that public domain content will become unavailable to the public echoes the 
scare tactics the content lobby used in its campaign to ban the VCR and, later, 
litigation against the first MP3 player (the Rio) and the first digital video re-
corder (Replay TV).185  
Today, there is enough information to assess the validity of these claims 
with data. And the data firmly establishes that their claims are simply not true. 
When books enter the public domain, there is an explosion in readership and 
availability, because public domain works can be provided for free online.186 In 
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fact, we know today that works are significantly more available once they enter 
the public domain.187 In defense of Jack Valenti, the content industry has gen-
erally been far behind the wave of modern technology, and some of Valenti’s 
statements on the public domain from 1995188 predated the modern Internet and 
the collapse of the cost of storage which has made individuals and enthusiasts 
easily able to make public domain ebook’s available to the world for free. 
While this obviously has had a negative effect on widespread unauthorized 
access to copyrighted works, cheap online storage and fast internet connections 
have had a significantly beneficial impact on lawful access to public domain 
works.189 
A 2012 review of Amazon’s book sales showed that books published after 
the critical public domain cut-off date of 1923, works under copyright just be-
fore they would enter the public domain but very old, are available at a dramat-
ically lower rate than books from the prior century which are extremely old.190 
This data doesn’t make sense, unless the public domain increased its availabil-
ity, since one wouldn’t expect that works from the 19th century would be nor-
mally more available than those from the early 20th century. This phenomenon 
is what The Atlantic Magazine has referred to as The Missing 20th Century.191  
The spike in availability starts right after works enter the public domain.192 
This study shows there are 700 percent more books available from the 1910s 
than from the 1950s, even though there were many more books published in 
the 1950s.193   
Figure 2: New books from Amazon warehouse by decade194 
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 SOURCE: Paul Heald 
This type of evidence is not limited to book availability. Another study by 
the same economist showed that when books enter the public domain, audio 
versions of those works become significantly more available and are of equal 
quality to those of copyrighted books.195 The creation of audiobooks is clear 
evidence of the market “taking care of the content” and “promoting distribu-
tion” with or without a clear financial motive.196 As of publication, there ap-
pears to be no counter-study to contradict the findings of these studies. 
F. Preventing Access to Cultural Legacy: Video 
The content industry’s claim197 that enabling the public domain will hinder 
consumers’ access to those works, or maintain those works for posterity, is not 
only contradicted by the empirical evidence, but also implies the content indus-
try itself is doing a good job investing in the commercialization, availability 
and preservation of older copyright works –– when overwhelming evidence 
demonstrates that in several mediums – movies, television and video games in 
particular – industry is doing a terrible job of preserving our cultural legacy 
and making them available to the public.  If copyright expired for older works, 
then an active fan base is likely to keep these works protected for posterity and 
available for others. 
To be clear: this is unlikely some malicious activity on their part; rather, as 
rational economic actors they simply have limited or no economic incentive in 
preserving works that they perceive as having marginal economic monetization 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 195 Paul Heald & Christopher Buccafusco, Do Bad Things Happen When Works Enter 
the Public Domain?: Empirical Tests of Copyright Term Extension, 28 BERKELEY TECH. L. 
J. 1 (2013) http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2130008 (Paul Heald on the 
public domain). 
 196 R Street Policy Study No. 20, supra note 6, at 12. 
 197 See Heald & Buccafusco, supra note 195. 
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opportunities. Further, any economic commercialization opportunities for older 
content may come at the expense of selling new content that they can sell at a 
premium. But while their intentions may not be malicious, the effects are very 
significant. 
As for availability, William Patry, author of How to Fix Copyright notes that 
of the Motown recordings, ninety-five percent are unavailable today.198 Jason 
Schultz compiled research and found that only 2.3% (4,267) of the 187,280 
books published in the US from 1927-1947 were available in 2002 from pub-
lishers at any price.199 Similarly, 9.2% of films were available.200  
A recent study by the Library of Congress demonstrates the industry has 
done an extremely poor job of preserving older films.201 Of the nearly 11,000 
silent feature films made from 1912 through 1929,202 the survey found only 
about 3,311 are known to exist today and only 1,575 exist in their original 35 
millimeter release format.203 The rest survive in foreign versions, are incom-
plete, or are in lower-quality formats.204 This means only about fourteen per-
cent of silent era films survived in their original form, and even those may not 
be in good quality today.205 Our culture is literally falling apart because copy-
right is preventing us from keeping it for the ages. 
This epidemic doesn’t just affect films, it also affects our television history 
for which has historically been even less of an economic incentive of preserv-
ing (reselling aired television content is a relatively new monetization method 
for the industry, before that there was little known incentive for long term 
preservation of master tapes).206 For example, BBC is currently missing 97 of 
800 Doctor Who episodes after the BBC had wiped its tapes.207 In fact, BBC 
was missing more episodes until in April 2009, while searching deep space for 
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extra-terrestrial signals, scientists in Puerto Rico discovered old television 
broadcasts that “seemed to be originating from deep space.”208 Several weeks 
of broadcasts were recovered through this method, including lost episodes of 
Doctor Who.209 
This is not the only example, it was also true of other classic shows like 
Dad’s Army210 and Z Cars.211 Even Monty Python’s Flying Circus almost suf-
fered this fate. 212 According to Monty Python troupe member Terry Jones, “the 
shows were nearly wiped [erased] by the BBC.”213 Jones says that in 1971 he 
got a call that the BBC was going to erase all of the original tapes to save mon-
ey.214 “That is what the BBC did in those days; they wanted the videotapes to 
reuse.215 According to the documentary, Gilliam came to the rescue, buying the 
run of ‘Python’ episodes before they could be erased.”216 
Incredibly, “[u]ntil the 1970s the networks did not have a systemic policy to 
preserve programming other than prime time. So all other genres -- sports, talk, 
daytime, news -- were haphazardly recorded and archived.”217 The first Super 
Bowl Sunday, January 15th, 1967, Green Bay Packers vs. Kansas City Chiefs, 
was watched by 27 million people; 218 however, while it was apparently origi-
nally recorded by the networks at some point “both networks either destroyed 
or recorded over their videotapes and for decades, Super Bowl 1 was missing 
and was considered one of the holy grails of missing television.”219 
But thirty eight years later, two reels of two-inch quadruplex were found of 
most of the game, missing the half-time show and a good portion of the third 
quarter as well as some of the commentary between plays.220 According to one 
estimate this tape was valued at over $1 million.221 As of 2011, even once the 
video was restored, no football fans had actually seen the recording of the 
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game as the Paley Center, which restored the video, was not the owner of the 
copyright.222 In fact, according to one article, even as of 2014, the NFL has 
asserted copyright to prevent anyone from viewing the restored footage of the 
original game.223  
This issue has been such a systemic problem that the Paley Center, an organ-
ization dedicated to the discussion of the cultural, creative and social signifi-
cance of television, radio and emerging platforms,224 keeps an active list of 
“lost” programs225 of major television programs they are looking for, the First 
Super Bowl was on this list until the damaged tape real was discovered.  
One under acknowledged aspect of this loss of accessible culture can be 
seen in access to older video games. Video games have, with only limited ex-
ceptions, never entered the public domain, because they have only existed in 
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 225 Id. (several examples removed). Their current list includes (emphasis added): 
The Opening of the World’s Fair with David Sarnoff and Franklin D. Roosevelt 
(April 20, 1939) 
This event marked the beginning of regularly scheduled telecasting, yet little visual 
record remains of these experimental years through World War II, including the first 
network program (October 17, 1941), in which a Philadelphia station carried a program 
originating from New York. 
News: 1946-55 
Esso Newsreel (NBC); CBS Evening News (CBS); All-Star News (ABC); Camera 
Headlings (DuMont; Camel News Caravan (NBC). 
Coverage of the 1948 Presidential Election 
Dewey or Truman? The election was covered by all networks; none of that coverage is 
known to exist. 
Actor’s Studio 
(1948-50) 
We are searching for examples of this live anthology series that featured such students 
of the legendary acting school as Kim Hunter, Julie Harris, Jessica Tandy, Martin Bal-
sam, and Marlon Brando. 
NFL Championship Game: Los Angeles Rams vs. Cleveland Browns 
(December 23, 1951) 
The first network coverage of a National Football League championship game is miss-
ing. In fact, many of the most famous televised sporting events are lost, including Don 
Larsen’s perfect game in the 1956 World Series between the New York Yankees and 
the Brooklyn Dodgers, and the classic 1958 NFL championship between the New York 
Giants and the Baltimore Colts. 
Open End 
(1958-66) 
Few episodes of this David Susskind series remain. We are particularly interested in: 
“The Young Giants” (February 1, 1959) with directors Fred Coe, John Frankenheimer, 
and Sidney Lumet; “Always Leave Them Laughing” (February 14, 1960) with writers 
Larry Gelbart, Mel Tolkin, and Mel Brooks; and “Television Tempest” (September 25, 
1960) with Ernie Kovacs, Rod Serling, and Sheldon Leonard. 
Id. 
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an era that has seen regular copyright extensions.226 But because video game 
generations move so quickly, one can easily see how older artistic works can 
quickly become completely unavailable to the general public – a far cry from 
the stated purpose of promoting the progress of the sciences when the general 
public can no longer access those materials in any form, sometimes for any 
price. 
Since new consoles are released every four to six years,227 and most game 
consoles have limited or no backwards compatibility,228 older games become 
unavailable for the general public to buy commercially. Used versions of those 
games may be difficult to acquire and require the maintenance of an old game 
console that is no longer available for sale or supported for repairs. As a result, 
much of entire generations of video games are effectively impossible for the 
average person to enjoy, and therefore, for other video game creators to learn 
from or build upon. Arts are generally iterative, and perhaps this is even truer 
with video games, so the idea that generations of a broadly defined “art form” 
are disappearing, likely significantly stifles artistic creation.229 
However, despite the ease of maintaining the availability of these materials, 
and seemingly financial interest to the copyright holder to do so, the evidence 
suggests that even Nintendo, with one of the best track records on this issue, 
fails to make most of their games available for purchase in any capacity.230 
Zachary Knight produced a small sample study on game availability and found 
that Nintendo’s Virtual Console doesn’t even scratch the surface of the classic 
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While consumers often cannot legally access the vast majority of these older 
games, consumers are finding ways around legal restrictions through the use of 
emulators232 to play essentially any older game illegally. These emulators are 
extremely popular to access games that cannot be legally played otherwise. 
The use of such software demonstrates a continued, and unmet, demand for 
these games.233 Very often those who use these emulators actually bought a 
copy of these games at one point for a previous console that they may no long-
er have or maintain. 
An iPhone234 has more than enough space and capacity to emulate every 
game console of Nintendo that is no longer available (but is not authorized by 
Nintendo and often requires the phone be jailbroken).235 Online downloads for 
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“every NES game,” the original Nintendo console, includes 13,337 games at a 
total size of around 250 MB (small enough to fit a smartphone).236 The exist-
ence of this gray market of emulators to play older consoles that can’t be 
bought new and download games that are no longer being sold, demonstrates 
that if copyright were to expire on video games, then the mainstream availabil-
ity of those materials that are no longer being sold would likely expand expo-
nentially. 
Many older PC games have developed a cult following of generations who 
continue to play those games long after they are being commercially sold, long 
after the operating systems they were written for are in use, and long after the 
company even supports game play online.237 While PC’s don’t have the prob-
lem that consoles have with an entirely new console being sold every six years 
or so with minimal or no backwards capability, PC gaming has its own techno-
logical difficulties. New Microsoft operating systems may have minimal or no 
support for playing games made for Windows 95, or for DOS (and certainly 
not older Macintosh operating systems).238 Sometimes there are hardware is-
sues in playing older games with modern 64-bit processors having difficulty 
playing games made for eight, sixteen or thirty-two bit processors.239 There are 
also potential graphics cards issues in displaying such older games on modern 
monitors with high resolution.240 But most importantly, there are often prob-
lems of online play for older PC games,241 which is the main allure for some 
games and the staying power of the video game itself. All of these problems 
could be dealt with quite easily if the game creators wanted to make their 
games accessible for modern audiences, or if game creators’ copyrights were 
to expire and demand was sufficiently strong. 
One of the most successful PC game franchises was the Command & Con-
quer series by Westwood, which is listed as one of the top selling PC fran-
chises in history having sold over 15 million copies.242 Later Command & 
Conquer games developed a strong following of online play – it’s one of the 
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first PC games with online play features, designed to work on dial up connec-
tions.243 Electronic Arts no longer sells the games individually, but it does sell 
these games as part of a collection of all Command & Conquer games – how-
ever, it no longer supports online play.244 This is problematic because one of 
the main draws of the Command & Conquer franchise was to play online, and 
with modern Ethernet connections being much faster than in the 1990’s, such a 
game could only improve with modern technology and a thriving user generat-
ed universe. Older games, like Command & Conquer, focused on online play 
for a variety of reasons, including that the artificial intelligence for computers 
was difficult to program.245 So if you wanted a real adversary in the game, you 
needed to play online against another person.  Essentially for a modern audi-
ence, to fully enjoy Command & Conquer, you have to play it online as to-
day’s artificial intelligence is very antiquated -- but unfortunately this is almost 
impossible and current copyright terms are part of the reason. 
Today, Electronic Arts no longer supports the game, so in order for custom-
ers to play the game online, they have to rely on servers operated by a Swiss 
company that effectively no longer works.246 Effective online play for these 
games is rendered impossible: creating new usernames no longer works, games 
frequently crash online, etc.247 There are millions of people who enjoyed these 
games and would like to play them online — and some who would even pay 
money to play them online as they were intended248 – but because Electronic 
Arts no longer supports the series, that is functionally impossible.  
If the Founders’ copyright term were in effect today, with copyright expand-
ed, originally just books, maps and charts, to now include video games, Elec-
tronic Arts’ original fourteen-year copyright would have expired for most of 
these games, or would soon expire, unless Electronic Arts chose to renew its 
copyright for another fourteen years and opted to pay to do so. Because Elec-
tronic Arts no longer supports these games, it’s highly likely that they would 
have chosen to let the copyright expire. 
If the copyright on these games expired, far from Jack Valenti’s fear that the 
public domain is a barren wasteland, these popular games could be repurposed 
and updated for modern operating systems, or remade as an online Facebook 
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game. Millions of new people could enjoy these incredible games that created 
an entire genre of video games: real time strategy games. Some of those may 
be inspired to create their own real time strategy game, because casual online 
video gaming that can be played in browser is a newer type of medium and 
Command & Conquer styled games are well suited for that modern medium.  
While repurposing these games would require some work for free, if an open-
source community can build an entire operating system and web browser for 
free and regularly maintain and update it, and if such a community can build 
the world’s largest encyclopedia, then an online community can repurpose old-
er games for a modern audience. This is even more predictable when one ana-
lyzes the explosion of user-generated content within games such as user creat-
ed maps and user generated modified games.249 Electronic Arts would likely 
benefit financially from Command & Conquer’s legacy games going open-
source because it has tried to create new Command & Conquer games but has 
had a variety of problems, stemming in part because newer generations are 
unfamiliar with the brand.250  New generations are losing this aspect of our cul-
ture, and at an alarming rate. 
Examining how copyright terms affect availability of older video games has 
received almost no scrutiny in academic literature, and while it’s a newer me-
dium of expression, if it is covered under copyright, then scholars must scruti-
nize how copyright best “promote[s] the [p]rogress of [the] [s]cience[s].”251 
Top video games today cost as much or more than top movie production –  the 
most expensive video game, Grand Theft Auto V from 2013, cost $265 million 
to produce and market252 which is comparable with the production costs, 
though not including the marketing, for the most expensive movie made in 
history “Pirates of the Caribbean - At Worlds End” which estimated at $400 
million.253 Video games generate profits that can surpass the top films, for ex-
ample, Grand Theft Auto V earned US $800 million in its first day and US $1 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 249 For example Valve’s “Half-Life” game was modified by Minh “Gooseman” Le and 
Jess “Cliffe” in 1999 to create “Counter-Strike” which would become one of the most popu-
lar games of all time (Valve would eventually buy out their intellectual property and re-
release a Counter-Strike series). See Counter-Strike, FROM PACMAN TO POOL, 
http://mediaindustries1.wordpress.com/valve-and-counter-strike/counter-strike/ (last visited 
Dec. 13, 2014). 
 250 See Paul Younger, New Command & Conquer Won’t Happen Anytime Soon, INC 
GAMERS (Oct. 31, 2013), http://www.incgamers.com/2013/10/new-command-conquer-wont-
happen-any-time-soon. 
 251 U.S. CONST. art. I § 8. 
 252 Luke Villapaz, ‘GTA 5’ Costs $265 Million to Develop and Market, Making it the 
Most Expensive Video Game Ever Produced: Report, INT’L BUS. TIMES (Sept. 8, 2013, 3:36 
PM), http://www.ibtimes.com/gta-5-costs-265-million-develop-market-making-it-most-
expensive-video-game-ever-produced-report. 
 253 Kirsten Acuna, The 30 Most Expensive Movies Ever Made, BUS. INSIDER (June 18, 
2014, 11:52 AM), http://www.businessinsider.com/most-expensive-movies-2014-6?op=1. 
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billion in its first three days making it the largest entertainment launch in histo-
ry.254 Therefore, if nothing else for the economic size of the video game mar-
ket, video games are a medium that should not be ignored.  In fact, there 
should be much more scrutiny and analysis of copyright term lengths impact 
on video games because they are a very unique medium, so the rules that apply 
to books, maps and charts may need to be adjusted for video games – the as-
sumptions that policy makers make on copyright may not hold true.255 
The original copyright terms of the 1790 Copyright Act applied only to 
books, maps and charts;256 these are mediums that were arguably “evolving,” as 
defined as building upon previous works, at a vastly different rate than video 
games. Furthermore, books, maps and charts have more of a timeless value. 
Good books, well researched maps and charts, will be of use for years ensuring 
a financial incentive for the publisher to keep them available while restricting 
others from publishing those works through copyright. But with video games, 
many game owners are not selling older games that they hold the rights too, 
while copyright is restricting anyone else from doing so, effectively removing 
culture from our society. Such a removal of culture from our society was not 
what the Founders intended with provisions to “promote the [p]rogress of the 
[s]cience[s].”257 
One can argue that long copyright terms are predicated under an implied as-
sumption that many older materials, no longer actively being promoted, gener-
ally exist somewhere, so if someone really wanted to access those materials it 
is possible for them to find them on Ebay, a library or a used book store. Now 
in practice this does not always happen,258 or these rare works become extreme-
ly expensive (with the revenue not going to the content creator but to the hold-
er of the work) but it’s an assumption that books and movies with some reader-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 254 Erik Kain, ‘Grand Theft Auto V’ Crosses $1B In Sales, Biggest Entertainment Launch 
In History, FORBES (Sept. 20, 2013, 1:22 PM), http://onforb.es/1vhHvVp. 
 255 Further modern copyright laws like the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) 
have had a particular impact upon the video game industry, pushing video game consoles to 
become fully digital. Before the DMCA it was lawful for companies to reverse engineer 
modern video game consoles and release their own video games for those consoles without 
paying the license fee to Nintendo, Sega or Artari. A lot more tinkering was allowed and 
flourished. But the DMCA effectively mandated the current closed video game market 
where every game must be licensed by the console maker etc. This change may be benefi-
cial or it may have had a negative effect for video game creation—certainly it likely harmed 
the potential for user generated games and it gave the console manufacturers much more 
leverage in demanding whatever licensing costs they would like. Thus copyright as applied 
to video games is much more complex than other mediums. 
 256 See R Street Policy Study No. 20, supra note 6, at 23. 
 257 See Feist Publications Inc., v. Rural Telephone Service Co., 499 U.S. 340, 349 (1991) 
(quoting U.S. CONST. art. I § 8). 
 258 For example, of the 187,280 books published between 1927-1946, only 2.3% were 
still in print in 2002. PATRY, supra note 4, at 201. 
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ship are still generally accessible somehow. But with video games, this simply 
may not be the case.  
100 plus years from now, an average person would be unlikely to be able to 
procure a working Nintendo 64 and play Nintendo 64 games legally. This is 
not an exaggeration, as copyright terms are so long today that the physical 
technology to play the copyrighted works will have disintegrated before it ex-
pires. Furthermore, other copyright laws like the DMCA may make it illegal to 
make an unauthorized version of any digital video game console. That physical 
medium, Nintendo 64, is highly unlikely to survive in working condition that 
long, even if well taken care of. One can argue that for games that retain com-
mercial value there may still be an incentive for the rights holder to make them 
available, but as can be shown through the popularity of emulators to play old-
er games and Knight’s study of Nintendo’s virtual console games, this market 
demand is simply not met.259 
Copyright is designed to promote the progress of the sciences and useful arts 
through a temporary monopoly, for a small exclusivity window to provide a 
large incentive for content creation. If this “limited times” is so long that the 
medium is no longer accessible after the expiration of monopoly, then it’s not 
enabling a public domain at all. If Nintendo is only going to sell Nintendo 64 
games for 6 years, and not even support the hardware after 10 years, do the 
original assumptions about copyright terms in other mediums make any sense 
as applied here? Do we want the force of law to prevent anyone from accessing 
video games that the producer has long forgotten about?  
G. Stifling Content Creation 
If we continue to subsidize rent-seeking by the heirs of existing copyright 
holders, rather than consider the interests of new content creators who need a 
shorter copyright term, we will stifle content creation. A number of orchestras, 
for example, have stopped performing Peter and the Wolf, by Prokofiev, since 
when the work returned to copyright protection after having been in the public 
domain, the cost of sheet music became prohibitive.260 A survey by the Con-
ductors Guild found that eighty-three percent of orchestral conductors have a 
general practice of conserving resources by limiting their performances and 
recordings of copyrighted works.261 About seventy percent said they are “no 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 259 This can be contrasted with record players. While the medium was largely non-used, 
record players have remained available to purchase new and recently most people are buy-
ing record players once again. Only Nintendo can sell Nintendo 64’s and they have stopped 
doing so. 
 260 R Street Policy Study No. 20, supra note 6, at 13. 
 261 Brief of the Conductors Guild and the Music Library Association as Amici Curiae 
Supporting Petitioners at 7 Golan v. Holder, 132 S.Ct. 873 (2011) (No. 10-545). 
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longer able to perform some works previously in the public domain … because 
those works are now under copyright protection.”262 
Many times, “remixing” of work from the public domain happens so subtly 
that the general public is completely unaware of the repackaging of previous 
ideas. Anyone who has watched DreamWorks’ “Shrek” series may have no-
ticed that the character Puss in Boots – a cat who stands on his hind legs wear-
ing shoes, bandana and a hat, while wielding a sword and exchanging witty 
banter – is based, however loosely, upon a 1729 French fairy tale by Charles 
Perrault.263 
H. A Vibrant Public Domain Benefits Society 
Sometimes, the repackaging of older works includes not just a character, but 
an entire storyline. The Motion Picture Patents Company, the organization that 
dominated the early American film market, built much of its business on pro-
ducing adaptations of books and plays in the public domain such as stories 
from the Bible, fairy tales and Shakespeare’s plays.264 Most of the Grimms’ 
fairy tales were first published in 1812, with the last edition produced in 
1857.265  More than 100 years later, when the Grimms’ work266 was no longer 
copyrighted, they still had utility for modern culture. “Disney’s recent 2013 
film Frozen was based upon an 1845 fairy tale by Hans Christian Anderson, 
entitled The Snow Queen.267 Sleeping Beauty from 1959 was based upon a 262-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 262 Id. Professor Peter Decherney, who is a Professor of Cinema Studies at the University 
of Pennsylvania, in an op-ed in the New York Times entitled Will Copyright Stifle Holly-
wood explains the impact of copyright extension and removing works that were in the public 
domain back under copyright [in 1994 under the Uruguay Round Agreements Act]:  
In my own field — film — the effects of the 1994 law have been palpable. Distributors 
of classic foreign films have seen their catalogs diminished. Students can no longer get 
copies of many films. Archivists have postponed the preservation of important films. 
And of course filmmakers have lost access to works of literature that they might have 
adapted and music that might have enhanced soundtracks…[m]ore important, for Hol-
lywood and every other American cultural industry, access to a stable and growing 
public domain has been essential to innovation. Unfortunately, even representatives of 
the American film industry don’t always recognize this truth…[t]he M.P.A.A. contends 
that the expansion of copyright is good for its industry. . .[b]ut history tells a different 
story. Filmmakers have consistently used public domain works to anchor artistic and 
technological innovation.  
Peter Decherney, Will Copyright Stifle Hollywood, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 5, 2011, at A27. 
 263 See CHARLES PERRAULT, THE MASTER CAR; OR, PUSS IN BOOTS (1697), available at 
http://www.pitt.edu/~dash/perrault04.html. 
 264 PETER DECHERNEY, HOLLYWOOD’S COPYRIGHT WARS: FROM EDISON TO THE INTERNET 
13 (John Belton ed., 2012). 
 265 Adam Gidwitz, The Twisted History of Snow White, INT’L READING ASS’N (Oct. 24, 
2013), http://bit.ly/1wKQAd5. 
 266 Id. 
 267 Derek Khanna, Unconstitutionally Long Copyright Terms Stifle Content Creation, 
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year-old folk tale published by Charles Perrault in 1697.”268  
Snow White from 1937 was based upon the Brothers Grimm folk tale from 
1812, and when Walt Disney was asked about that film he explained that “[he] 
picked that story because ‘it was well known and I knew we could do some-
thing with seven ‘screwy’ dwarfs….’”269 It was well known because three pre-
vious versions of Snow White had already been created by 1937, a direct result 
of it being in the public domain, and Disney himself remembered having seen 
work performed before while growing up in Kansas City.270 
Under the current extremist copyright regime, as lobbied for by the content 
industry and enabled by Congress, there would never be another Disney Corp., 
whose success has been highly dependent on derivative characters and stories 
plucked from the public domain. Here is a short list of works created by Dis-
ney with story-lines mostly or entirely based upon works in the public domain 
(including the domestic box office revenues from the film, if available, but not 
including the often larger global revenues and other ancillary forms of lucra-
tive merchandising and monetization): 
 
Table 1: Major Disney films based on public domain works271 
 






	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Just Ask Disney, THE HUFFINGTON POST (May. 5, 2014), http://huff.to/Qemdcv; see also 
Drew Taylor, Trapped In Ice: Inside The 70-year Journey Frozen Took To Get To The Big 
Screen, SNN (Nov. 26, 2013), http://bit.ly/1x57Yv3. 
 268 Khanna, supra note 267. 
 269 WALT DISNEY: A TRIUMPH OF AMERICAN IMAGINATION 216 (2006). 
 270 Brief of Peter Decherney as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 16-17 Golan 
v. Holder, 132 S.Ct. 873 (2012) (No. 10-545). 
 271 Derek Khanna, 50 Disney Movies Based on the Public Domain, FORBES (Feb. 3, 
2014, 10:12 AM); Other films in the Disney vault include ones based on the Arthurian leg-
ends; Greek myths; Aesop’s fables; English folk tales of Robin Hood; the Chinese legend of 
Hua Mulan; Plato’s legend of Atlantis; Charles Perrault’s “Cinderella” (1697); Daniel De-
foe’s “Robinson Crusoe” (1719); Johann Goethe’s “The Sorcerers’ Apprentice” (1797); the 
life of Pocahontas; the Brothers Grimm’s “The Frog Prince” and “Rapunzel” (1812); Sir 
Walter Scott’s “Rob Roy” (1817); Washington Irving’s “The Legend of Sleepy Hollow” 
(1820); Victor Hugo’s “The Hunchback of Notre Dame” (1831); Hans Christian Anderson’s 
“The Little Mermaid” (1837); Charles Dickens’ “Oliver Twist” (1839) and “A Christmas 
Carol” (1843); Alexandre Dumas’ “The Three Musketeers” (1844); Jules Verne’s “In 
Search of the Castaways” (1868), “20,000 Leagues Under the Sea” (1870) and “Around the 
World in 80 Days” (1873); Robert Louis Stevenson’s “Treasure Island” (1883) and “Kid-
napped” (1886); Kenneth Grahame’s “The Reluctant Dragon” (1898) and “The Wind in the 
Willows” (1908); Jack London’s “White Fang” (1906); and Edgar Rice Burroughs’ “Tarzan 
of the Apes” (1914) and “A Princess of Mars” (1917). See Eddy Ledinick, Disney’s 54 
Classic Animated Vault Films, IMDB, http://www.imdb.com/list/ls003947956/ (last visited 
Sept. 8, 2014). 
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($M) 
Snow White and 
the Seven Dwarves 
1937 Brothers Grimm folk 
tale 
1812 910.2 10 
Fantasia 1940 Bach, Tchaikovsky, 
Beethoven and other 
classical compositions 
Various 693.4 22 
The Jungle Book 1967 Novel by Rudyard 
Kipling 
1894 615.2 30 
Sleeping Beauty  1959 Charles Perrault folk 
tale/ Tchaikovsky 
ballet 
1697/1890 606.8 31 
Pinocchio 1940 Novel by  
Carlo Collodi 
1883 562.8 39 
 Swiss Family 
Robinson  
1960 Novel by Johann 
David Wyss 
1812 449.3 83 
Aladdin 1992 “One Thousand and 
One Nights”  
1706 437.9 89 
Frozen 2013 Hans Christian Ander-
son’s “Ice Queen” 
1845 384.6 115 
Beauty and the 
Beast  
1991 G-S Barbot de Ville-
neuve’s book 
1775 378.8 121 
Alice in Wonder-
land  
2010 Lewis Carroll’s book  1865 351.0 147 
Inflation-adjusted domestic gross box office figures courtesy of boxofficemojo.com 
 
This partial list demonstrates how one company, Disney, has been enor-
mously successful repackaging older story-lines from the public domain. In-
credibly, while Disney was making its first feature film of Snow White, based 
on the public domain, they were considering making a feature film of Alice in 
Wonderland, but Disney “put the project on hold” because he believed that 
rights to Alice in Wonderland were not in the public domain.272 Disney was “so 
committed to using public domain works that he was willing to wait until all of 
the rights were clearly lapsed, and he finally released his version of Alice in 
1951.”273 
The Disney Corporation, of course, added their own secret sauce, but the da-
ta shows that even 262-year-old story-lines easily can be translated to the mod-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 272 Brief of Peter Decherney as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 16-17 Golan 
v. Holder, 132 S.Ct. 873 (2012) (No. 10-545). 
 273 Id. at 17-18. 
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ern world. In fact, not only are the characters and stories based on the public 
domain, but in some cases, so is much of the music.274 Furthermore, the origi-
nal Mickey Mouse short film, “Steamboat Willie,” was itself a parody of 
Buster Keaton’s “Steamboat Bill Jr.”275 A parody is a form of fair use that 
builds upon the works of others. 
Under current policy, there will never be another Disney. While Disney took 
and reused from the public domain, none of the works created by Disney are in 
the public domain for others to build upon.276 If current policy is extended, they 
never will. As Harvard Law Professor Lawrence Lessig has remarked, the 
Sonny Bono Copyright Extension Act ensures that “no one can do to Disney as 
Disney did to the Brothers Grimm.”277  
The content industry has essentially argued that copyright represents their 
natural right to property, a perspective vastly disconnected with the evidence 
from our founding era.278 Under the content industry’s logic, reusing others’ 
works without paying royalties or licensing is always stealing and they have 
pushed for more and more restrictions upon doctrines like fair use.279  
If, in the vernacular of the content industry, taking other people’s work 
without paying for it is always stealing, then the Disney Corp. is responsible 
for one of the greatest thefts in world history. Hollywood has “derived more 
profit from reusing public domain works than any other industry in history,” 
yet lobbies for policies to ensure their works never enter the public domain.280 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 274 Boosey & Hawkes Music Publishers v. Walt Disney Co., 145 F.3d 481, 484 (2nd Cir. 
1998). 
 275 LESSIG, supra note 13, at 24. 
 276 Michael De Groote, Mickey Mouse Copyright Laws May Last Forever, DESERET 
NEWS NAT’L (Nov. 1, 2013), http://national.deseretnews.com/article/544/mickey-mouse-
copyright-laws-may-last-forever.html. 
 277 Steven Levy, Lawrence Lessig’s Supreme Showdown, WIRED MAG., 
http://archive.wired.com/wired/archive/10.10/lessig_pr.html. 
 278 See generally Derek Slater, An Interview with Jack Valenti, A COPYFIGHTER’S MUS-
INGS (Feb. 3, 2003), 
http://cmusings.blogspot.com/2003_02_02_cmusings_archive.html#88495460. 
 279 Id. Rep. Marsha Blackburn, R-Tenn. – one of the content industry’s most ardent sup-
porters in Congress – has even ridiculed the concept of fair use itself: 
I find it is like when you say you cannot be a little bit pregnant, so how do you go snip 
just a little bit of what somebody has created and where do you draw that line? It is like 
when my children were little, I would say, they would say something and it would be 
just a little white lie but little white lies lead to great big lies. And I think we have to 
begin to look at this issue not as just piracy, not as just snippets, but we have to look at 
it as theft. 
Fair Use: Its Effects on Consumers and Industry, Before the Subcomm. On Commerce, 
Trade, and Consumer Protection of the Comm. On Energy and Commerce, 109th Cong. 
(2005) (Statement of Rep. Marsha Blackburn). 
 280 Brief of Peter Decherney as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 7 Golan v. 
Holder, 132 S.Ct. 873 (2012) (No. 10-545). 
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I. The Need for a Vibrant Public Domain of More Recent Works 
According to a study by the Copyright Office, under the law that existed un-
til 1978, as much as eighty-five percent of all works under copyright in 1984 
would have entered the public domain on January 1, 2013.281 For content crea-
tors who didn’t think it was worth renewing those copyrights, those works, 
books, music and movies would be available to use and repurpose for free and 
without permission. Ninth Circuit Appellate Court Judge Alex Kozinski has 
recognized that “[c]reativity is impossible without a rich public domain. Noth-
ing today, likely nothing since we tamed fire, is genuinely new: [c]ulture, like 
science and technology, grows by accretion, each new creator building on the 
works of those who came before. Overprotection stifles the very creative force 
it’s supposed to nurture.”282 
The shrinking and limitation on the future public domain is a big deal be-
cause, as Professor Peter Decherney notes in his amicus brief that: 
[a] stable public domain has been, and remains, the most dependable tool in Holly-
wood’s arsenal of risk-mitigating and stabilizing measures. Public domain works are 
time-tested; they have name recognition; and they come with build-in audiences. . . 
.Today’s independent producers can no longer expect new works to enter the public 
domain any time soon. They also have a smaller pool of public domain works to draw 
from than their predecessors.283 
What if the works of Mozart, Dickens and Shakespeare were all under copy-
right and privately held? Has the public not been better served by having these 
works available for free to learn from and build upon? Would our generation 
and future generations not be better off with the older works of Disney availa-
ble to build upon for free? That’s what the founders thought.284 But under mod-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 281 What Could Have Entered the Public Domain on January 1, 2013?, CENTER FOR THE 
STUDY OF THE PUB. DOMAIN, http://web.law.duke.edu/cspd/publicdomainday/2013/pre-1976 
(last visited Sept. 8, 2014). 
 282 White v. Samsung Electronics of Am., Inc., 989 F.2d 1512, 1513 (9th Cir. 1993) 
(Kozinski, J., dissenting). Judge Kozinski added that these “rights aren’t free: [t]hey’re im-
posed at the expense of future creators and of the public at large.” Id. at 1516 (Kozinski, J., 
dissenting). He observed that the law “is full of careful balances between what’s set aside 
for the owner and what’s left in the public domain for the rest of us.” Id. (Kozinski, J., dis-
senting). These balances “let the public use something created by someone else. But all are 
necessary to maintain a free environment in which creative genius can flourish.” Id. 
(Kozinski, J., dissenting). 
 283 Brief of Peter Decherney as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 6-7, 19 Golan 
v. Holder, 132 S.Ct. 873 (2012) (No. 10-545). 
 284 Thomas Jefferson was much more skeptical of copyright and patents than James 
Madison and the Founders rejected his suggestions such as specifically listing a specific 
term length in the Constitution itself. Jefferson’s work should be read skeptically to ascer-
tain the original public meaning of the copyright clause since the Founder’s disagreed with 
his conclusions; however, Jefferson’s perspective on the costs of copyright and patents, and 
the novelty of providing statutory property rights is enlightening. See Thomas Jefferson to 
Isaac McPherson, supra note 29 
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ern law, the masterpieces of our era, and generations of recent past, may never 
be available to build upon. 
V. FINDING THE OPTIMAL LENGHT OF COPYRIGHT TERMS 
On February 5, 1841, Thomas Macaulay gave a speech on copyright to the 
House of Commons, and presented a number of arguments concerning the 
danger of copyright maximalism.285  
Macaulay’s comparison of copyright with the East India Company’s mo-
nopoly on tea and Lord Essex’s monopoly on sweet wines is the same as Adam 
Smith’s comparison with merchants establishing a new trade route in a danger-
ous region. 286 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
If nature has made any one thing less susceptible than all others of exclusive property, 
it is the action of the thinking power called an idea, which an individual may exclusive-
ly possess as long as he keeps it to himself; but the moment it is divulged, it forces it-
self into the possession of every one, and the receiver cannot dispossess himself of it. . 
.[t]hat ideas should freely spread from one to another over the globe, for the moral and 
mutual instruction of man, and improvement of his condition, seems to have been pe-
culiarly and benevolently designed by nature, when she made them, like fire, expansi-
ble over all space, without lessening their density in any point, and like the air in which 
we breathe, move, and have our physical being, incapable of confinement or exclusive 
appropriation. Inventions then cannot, in nature, be a subject of property. Society may 
give an exclusive right to the profits arising from them, as an encouragement to men to 
pursue ideas which may produce utility, but this may or may not be done, according to 
the will and convenience of the society, without claim or complaint from anybody. 
Id. 
 285 Macaulay on Copyright, THE PUB. DOMAIN, 
http://www.thepublicdomain.org/2014/07/24/macaulay-on-copyright/ (last visited Sept. 27, 
2014) (referencing Thomas Babington Macaulay’s First Speech to the House of Commons 
on Copyright). 
Sir, that I may safely take it for granted that the effect of monopoly generally is to 
make articles scarce, to make them dear, and to make them bad. And I may with equal 
safety challenge my honorable friend to find out any distinction between copyright and 
other privileges of the same kind; any reason why a monopoly of books should produce 
an effect directly the reverse of that which was produced by the East India Company’s 
monopoly of tea, or by Lord Essex’s monopoly of sweet wines. . . It is good that au-
thors should be remunerated; and the least exceptionable way of remunerating them is 
by a monopoly. 
Id. 
 286 See SMITH, supra note 9 
When a company of merchants undertake, at their own risk and expense, to establish a 
new trade with some remote and barbarous nation, it may not be unreasonable to incor-
porate them into a joint stock company, and to grant them, in case of their success, a 
monopoly of the trade for a certain number of years. It is the easiest and most natural 
way in which the state can recompense them for hazarding a dangerous and expensive 
experiment, of which the public is afterwards to reap the benefit. A temporary monopo-
ly of this kind may be vindicated upon the same principles upon which a like monopoly 
of a new machine is granted to its inventor, and that of a new book to its author. But 
upon the expiration of the term, the monopoly ought certainly to determine; the forts 
2014] COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 99 
Here Macaulay not only uses the terminology of Madison, but he makes a 
similar argument. Madison argued that:  
[G]rants of this sort [monopolies] can be justified in very peculiar cases only, if at all, 
the danger being very great that the good resulting from the operation of the monopo-
ly, will be overbalanced by the evil effect of the precedent, and it being not impossible 
that the monopoly itself, in its original operation, may produce more evil than good.287  
But like James Madison, Macaulay also argues that the good of copyright is 
such that we must accept some evil.288 Macaulay, however, expands from our 
knowledge of Madison’s opinion to provide one way to assess the proper bal-
ance “the evil ought not to last a day longer than is necessary for the purpose 
of securing the good.”289 
Macaulay goes on to argue that the longer copyright terms are, the more the 
harm must be balanced out by some benefit.290 
A monopoly of sixty years produces twice as much evil as a monopoly of thirty years, 
and thrice as much evil as a monopoly of twenty years. But it is by no means the fact 
that a posthumous monopoly of sixty years gives to an author thrice as much pleasure 
and thrice as strong a motive as a posthumous monopoly of twenty years. On the con-
trary, the difference is so small as to be hardly perceptible.291  
One can disagree that copyright should not “last a day longer than is neces-
sary for the purpose of securing the good,”292 but it does provide a useful way 
to think about the subject. Furthermore, copyright can incentivize more than 
the original writing of the work, and it’s important for policy-makers to be 
confident of what the good is that needs to be secured through copyright: is the 
good writing a book, publishing a book, investing in public relations around a 
book, converting that book into a movie, investing in technology to remake 
that movie or update the movie for 3D.  
But, unlike in Macaulay’s day, today we have a significant amount of data 
on the optimal term length of copyright. Therefore, policy-makers can take an 
honest approach: what does the data show on how the Founders copyright is 
insufficient or invalid for the modern economy and how can it be extended or 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
and garrisons, if it was found necessary to establish any, to be taken into the hands of 
government, their value to be paid to the company, and the trade to be laid open to all 
the subjects of the state. By a perpetual monopoly, all the other subjects of the state are 
taxed very absurdly in two different ways: first, by the high price of goods, which, in 
the case of a free trade, they could buy much cheaper; and, secondly, by their total ex-
clusion from a branch of business which it might be both convenient and profitable for 
many of them to carry on. 
Id. 
 287 Madison, supra note 27. 
 288 Macaulay on Copyright, supra note 285. 
 289 Id. 
 290 Id. 
 291 Id. (referencing Thomas Babington Macaulay’s First Speech to the House of Com-
mons on Copyright). 
 292 Id. 
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improved for modern content and dissemination. This question, what does the 
data say, is how Congress approached the issue of copyright term length be-
fore, as the 1909 report already cited from the Senate Committee on Patents (S. 
9440) stated that “Congress must consider...two questions: [f]irst, how much 
will the legislation stimulate the producer and so benefit the public; and, se-
cond, how much will the monopoly granted be detrimental to the public.”293 
Congress must use copyright to confer “a benefit upon the public that out-
weighs the evils of the temporary monopoly.”294  
There have been several studies on optimal copyright term length, and all 
have concluded that our current term lengths are counter-productive.295  Even 
the Congressional Research Service concluded the added incentive to create 
new works provided by a twenty-year extension to the term of copyright was 
small compared to existing incentives.296 A study from Cambridge University 
found the optimal copyright term is around fifteen years and found with nine-
ty-five percent certainty that the optimal term of copyright should be less than 
thirty years.297  
 
 
















	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 293 COMM. ON PATENTS, TO AMEND AND CONSOLIDATE ACTS RESPECTING COPYRIGHT, 
H.R. REP. NO. 2222, at 7 (1909). 
 294 Id. 
 295 R Street Policy Study No. 20, supra note 6, at 20-21. 
 296 EDWARD RAPPAPORT, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., COPYRIGHT TERM EXTENSION: ESTI-
MATING THE ECONOMIC VALUES 4 (1998). 
 297 POLLOCK, supra note 3, at 22. 
 298 Id. 
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Current copyright terms are so long that they are literally off the chart, 
many standard deviations beyond optimal terms. 
 
In 1999, as part of the Eldred case, Hal R. Varian, then-dean of the School 
of Information Management and Systems at the University of California at 
Berkeley, submitted an affidavit on the economic incentives of longer copy-
right terms, finding an insignificant difference on the incentives to produce 
between a “life plus seventy” term and a “life plus fifty” term.299 
In 2003, the Economist magazine ran an editorial arguing for a fourteen-year 
copyright term, noting that “[c]opyright was originally the grant of a temporary 
government-supported monopoly on copying a work, not a property 
right...[s]tarting from scratch today, no rational, disinterested lawmaker would 
agree to copyrights that extend to seventy years after an author’s death, now 
the norm in the developed world.”300 
In 2009, Professors Ivan Png and Qiu-hong Wang analyzed the production 
of films, books and movies in nineteen OECD countries that, at various points 
between 1991 and 2005, had extended the statutory terms of copyright.301 Their 
research demonstrated no evidence that the longer terms of copyright caused 
the creation of more works.302 Given that we know the harm of longer terms, if 
there is no evidence of benefit, this is extremely significant. 
In 2010, a group of leading experts on copyright law and policy released a 
report on reforms to U.S. copyright law.303 Their report, The Copyright Princi-
ples Project: Directions for Reform, includes many well-received proposals for 
reforming the copyright system, and the leader of this project testified with this 
report before Congress in 2013 to present the findings.304  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 299 Affidavit of Hal R. Varian at 1,4 Eldred, et al. v. Reno, 74 F.Supp.2d 1 (D.D.C. 
1999). 
 300 Copyrights: A radical rethink, THE ECONOMIST (Jan. 23, 2003), 
http://www.economist.com/node/1547223. 
 301 See L.P.L. Png & Qui-hong Wang, Copyright Law and the Supply of Creative Work: 
Evidence from the Movies, SERCI 3 (Mar. 2009), http://www.serci.org/2009/png.pdf. 
 302 See id. 
 303 See Pamela Samuelson et al., The Copyright Principles Project: Directions for Re-
form, 25 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1175, 1176 (2010) (“The goal of the [Copyright Principles 
Project] CPP was to explore whether it was possible to reach some consensus about how 
current copyright law could be improved and how the law’s current problems could be miti-
gated.”). 
 304 See Terry Hart, Copyright Principles Project: Increasing the US Copyright Office’s 
Role, COPYHYPE (Nov. 1, 2010), http://bit.ly/16zxP2o (“Working together they crafted twen-
ty-five specific proposals…[r]eaction to the report from the Copyright Principles Project has 
been generally positive.”); Hearing on A Case Study in Consensus Building: The Copyright 
Principles Project Before the H. SubComm. on Courts, Intellectual Property and the Inter-
net, Comm. on Judiciary, 113th Cong. 1 (2013) (statement of Pamela Samuelson, Richard 
M. Sherman Distinguished Professor, Berkley Law School). 
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In November 2012, the House Republican Study Committee offered a pro-
posal for copyright terms that would start out as free, but would gradually 
grow to require a larger fee and would terminate after forty-six years.305 The 
specific terms advised by that report were: 
A. Free 12-year copyright term for all new works – subject to registration, and all ex-
isting works are renewed as of the passage of the reform legislation. If passed today 
this would mean that new works have a copyright until 2024. 
B. Elective 12-year renewal (cost 1% of all United States revenue from first 12 years 
– which equals all sales). 
C. Elective 6-year renewal (cost 3% of revenue from the previous 12 years). 
D. Elective 6-year renewal (cost 5% of revenue in previous 6 years). 
E. Elective 10-year renewal (10% of ALL overall revenue – [minus] fees paid so 
far).306 
Under this system economic actors would make a choice on whether to re-
new their copyright at an increasing fee rate – the idea being that since the cost 
of copyright terms to society and other content creators, versus the benefit of 
the content creation, becomes more significant the longer copyright terms are, 
then if an owner wanted to renew their term every term would become more 
expensive until it reached market equilibrium and they chose not to renew be-
cause the economic costs were higher than the expected value. This proposal 
was designed to use market forces to have copyright holders choose how much 
retaining their copyright was worth. If a copyright holder like Disney decided 
they wanted to maximize their monetization of some AAA movie, then they 
would have the option of paying the high cost to receive the full forty-six 
years.307 Under this proposal, content valued at a lower monetary value would 
be unlikely to be renewed and registered beyond the first renewal period. 
Things that are not intended to be under copyrights protection, like normal e-
mails, texts, tweets and Facebook messages, would, by default, not be copy-
righted unless someone took an affirmative act to copyright them.308 
  The purpose of the report was to begin a conversation on how to fix 
copyright by restoring its original public meaning under the Constitution – and 
given that purpose, it did help foster a debate. The report was generally well 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 305 Derek Khanna, RSC Policy Brief: Three Myths About Copyright Law and Where to 
Start to Fix It, REPUBLICAN STUDY COMM. 8 (Nov. 16, 2012), http://bit.ly/1v8o7tj. To be 
clear this is not my personal recommendation. I was asked to produce this report on behalf 
of a Congressional organization of over one-hundred-sixty Members of Congress. 
 306 Id. 
 307 Compare The Copyright Act of 1831, 4 Stat. 436 (1831); with The Copyright Act of 
1909, Pub. L. No. 60-349, 35 Stat. 1075 (1909). 
 308 To be clear while the author of this piece authored that report for the RSC, the report 
was the consensus of the staff members of the organization, and the author presently would 
improve upon some of the ideas there rather than implement that exact proposal, it was cre-
ated for the committee and to foster a debate on potential reforms. 
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received, particularly by conservative and libertarian organizations.309  Since 
the report, there has been more serious consideration of copyright term reform 
on several fronts.310  
A. Copyrighting One Billion Facebook Messages Per Day 
The disparity between the Founder’s copyright of fourteen years and modern 
copyright terms that last longer than anyone could ever be alive should be par-
ticularly glaring to modern audiences who have seen a massive expansion of 
the scope of copyright, in addition to the length.  Today, everyone is a content 
creator in a way that average people were not in the early twentieth century. 
Protecting our personal e-mails, Facebook posts, and tweets under copyright 
for our lifetimes, plus seventy years, does not seem to meaningfully fulfill the 
constitutional mandate of promoting the progress of the sciences. Furthermore, 
social norms on those forms of creation differ extremely from the law. Of 
course, this is not to justify large-scale piracy, but social norms are such today 
that forwarding an e-mail from a friend is not perceived as a potential legal 
problem – even among the most litigious in favor of maximalist copyright po-
sitions. However, under many readings of the copyright statutes, the content of 
your e-mails are copyrighted and forwarding an e-mail without permission, 
especially if the e-mail says not to forward, could be considered copyright in-
fringement, making you liable.311 
Professor Tom W. Bell’s book, Intellectual Privilege: Copyright, Common 
Law, and the Common Good,312 makes a compelling case for restoring the cop-
yright term of the Founders for fourteen years with a potential fourteen year 
extension if the author is still alive.313 While this author is not convinced that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 309 See Ezra Klein, Derek Khanna Wants You to Be Able to Unlock Your Cellphone, 
WASH. POST (Mar. 9, 2013), http://wapo.st/11FRE5D (“The memo was approved…and put 
online, where the reaction was enthusiastic. ‘The American Conservative Union put the 
memo on their front page,’ Khanna says.”). 
 310 See The Register’s Call for Updates to U.S. Copyright Law: Hearing Before the S. 
Comm. on Courts, Intellectual Property and the Internet Comm. on the Judiciary, 133th 
Cong. 7-8 (2013) (statement of Maria A. Pallante. Register of Copyrights, United States 
Copyright Office) (suggesting that Congress should reconsider the “principle of copyright 
law that copyright owners should grant prior approval for reproduction and dissemination of 
their works,”); see also DEP’T OF COMMERCE: INTERNET TASK FORCE, COPYRIGHT POLICY, 
CREATIVITY, AND INNOVATION IN THE DIGITAL ECONOMY 29-30 (July 2013) (stating that the 
extension of copyright terms has been a factor in the creation of the “orphan works” prob-
lem); see Pethokoukis, supra note 2 (arguing that copyright law has become a form of cro-
nyism for companies). 
 311 Ned Snow, A Copyright Conundrum: Protecting Email Privacy, 55 U. KAN. L. REV. 
501, 507-8 (2007). 
 312 TOM W. BELL, INTELLECTUAL PRIVILEGE: COPYRIGHT, COMMON LAW, AND THE COM-
MON GOOD (Founders’ ed., 1st ed. 2014). 
 313 See generally id. (advocating a return to the copyright laws as established in The 
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this short term is necessarily optimal, while “fourteen plus fourteen” years may 
seem short, it should be noted that commercial exploitation of a work took 
much longer in 1790.314 In 1790 it was much more difficult to get a book print-
ed, it was slower to distribute the book by land and ship or to get it stocked in 
book stores, and it took a longer time to advertise a work across the country.315 
Because today’s commercial exploitation can often reach a global audience in 
a matter of days or hours, the argument for needing copyright durations expo-
nentially longer from that of our Founders seems more difficult to sustain. 
However, at the same time, today books can be turned into movies and other 
derivative works that didn’t exist in the 18th century. The costs of modern pro-
duction of a major film are vastly higher than the costs of producing and dis-
tributing a book in the 18th century, but the ability to monetize has also kept up 
significantly, and given the revenue curves for movies, if a movie does not 
make its cost back in the first twenty-eight years, it’s unlikely to make up the 
rest of the difference in the next hundred.  
B. Congressional Capture, Comparing Evolution of Patent and Copyright law 
We’ve established how rights holders, as rational economic actors, have a 
vested interest in manipulating the system to benefit themselves while poten-
tially hurting new content creators, but there is also robust data to support con-
gressional capture, which can be most clearly demonstrated by comparing the 
evolution in copyright terms with the evolution in patent terms.316  
Both copyright and patents began with terms of fourteen years, but while 
copyright has extended 580%, patent terms have only expanded 43%, to twen-
ty years.317 And copyrights and patents were both considered by James Madi-
son as a form of monopoly where the benefit outweighs the “evil.”318 Thus, 
analyzing the evolution of copyrights versus the evolution of patents helps 
demonstrates the direct impact of cronyism.319 As Edward C. Walterscheid ex-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Copyright Act of 1790 and the copyright of the book itself was structured to reflect those 
copyright laws). 
 314 See e.g., WILLIAM PATRY, COPYRIGHT LAW AND PRACTICE 34 (2000) (between 1790-
1800 “the distribution of books was primarily local.”). 
 315 See e.g., Robert A. Gross, Introduction, in HISTORY OF THE BOOK IN AMERICA VOL. 2, 
AN EXTENSIVE REPUBLIC: PRINT, CULTURE, AND SOCIETY IN THE NEW NATION, 1790-1840 5-
6 (Robert A. Gross & Mary Kelley eds., 2010) (describing the extensive periods of time it 
took to circulate printed news throughout the last decade of 18th century America and into 
the 19th Century) 
 316 See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 201-02 (2003) (“Because the Clause empower-
ing Congress to confer copyrights also authorizes patents, congressional practice with re-
spect to patents informs our inquiry.”). 
 317 Walterscheid, supra note 65, at 41. 
 318 Madison, supra note 27. 
 319 However, the Supreme Court has noted that in regard to copyright and patents, “[t]he 
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plains “While there are recognizable similarities between the Patent Act of 
1790 and the present patent statutes, one is hard pressed to find much recog-
nizable from the Copyright Act of 1790 in the present copyright statutes.”320 
For copyright, there is a one major interest group that effectively manipu-
lates the system and ensures works never enter the public domain.321 On the 
other side, there is no discernable opposition interest group with anywhere near 
a comparable interest in stopping this elongation.322  
But in the realm of patent terms, there are interest groups on both sides of 
the issue.323  For every company that benefits from patent protection, there are 
other companies waiting for that protection to end, so they can use the technol-
ogy. However, it’s even more complex than that, because these two sides are 
often represented even internally within a company, where the company gets 
its new inventions patented but is also waiting on its competitors patents to 
lapse.324 There are certainly “patent trolls”325 that only have a pecuniary interest 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
two areas of law, naturally, are not identical twins.” and care must be taken “in applying 
doctrine formulated in one area to the other.” But nonetheless the Court has acknowledged 
the “historic kinship between patents law and copyright law.” Sony Corp. of Am. v. Univer-
sal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 439, n. 19 (1984); See Edward C. Walterscheid, Diver-
gent Evolution of the Patent Power and the Copyright Power, 9 Intell. Prop. L. Rev. 307, 
309 (2005) 
[T]he grouping of the patent power and the copyright power in the same clause sug-
gests that the Framers viewed them as at least fraternal twins with similar characteris-
tics. That this was the case is further evidenced by the use of the singular “the exclu-
sive Right” with regard to both powers. It is reasonable to assume that by using the 
singular “the exclusive Right” and combining authority to create bother patents and 
copyrights in the same Clause, the Framers intended the legal consequences of both the 
patent grant and the copyright grant to be similar, if not identical. 
Id. 
 320 Walterscheid, supra note 319, at 308-09. 
 321 See Copyright Extremists Shouldn’t Control Information, supra note 10 (discussing 
the “copyright lobby”). 
 322 See Timothy B. Lee, 15 Years Ago, Congress kept Mickey Mouse Out of the Public 
Domain. Will They Do it Again?, WASH. POST  (Oct. 25, 2013), http://wapo.st/1gu2nCJ 
(“[N]on-profit groups…served as public-interest watchdogson copyright issues…[b]ut his 
efforts to recruit them to fight term extension fell flat. With the bill looking unstoppable, 
most of the groups chose to make peace with the forces pushing the bill.”). 
 323 See e.g., Gary Robbins, Consumers to Benefit as Patent Expires on Plavix, UT SAN 
DIEGO (May 4, 2012 6:30 AM), http://bit.ly/1v8oDYj (explaining that the patent term for the 
drug Plavix, which generated 4.7 billion dollars of revenue in 2010, was set to expire and 
that generic forms would hit the market at that time). 
 324 In 2009 the patent for FDM printing technology expired, allowing 3D printing com-
panies to utilize this technology. These 3D printing companies in turn patent their own 
printing process. Melba Kurman & Hod Lipson, Why Patents Won’t Kill 3D-Printing Inno-
vation (Op-Ed), LIVESCIENCE (July 29, 2013, 10:25 AM), 
http://www.livescience.com/38494-3d-printing-and-patent-protection.html. 
 325 Brenda Sandburg, Trolling for Dollars; Patent Enforcers Are Scaring Corporate 
America, and They’re Getting Rich – Very Rich – Doing It; Special Report; Patent Enforc-
ers, LAW.COM 1 (July 30, 2001), http://www.phonetel.com/pdfs/lwtrolls.pdf (“A patent troll 
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for longer and stronger patent terms, but many big companies that lobby have 
interests on both sides.326  Therefore, as far as Washington sees the issue, there 
are interest groups on both sides (albeit with different levels of strength), and 
major companies have interests split between the two sides. This is not to say 
that patent policy is perfect, Madison warned us to “guard” both copyrights 
and patents “ag[ain]st abuse,”327 and appeared to be more worried about patents 
as well, but at least more than one vested interest is represented in the policy 
discussion for patents. 
Patents represent a deal between innovators and the general public: teach the 
world how to make your invention (thereby no longer having a trade secret) 
and, in return, you get an exclusive period to profit from that invention through 
a government-granted monopoly, which we treat like a property right.328 The 
various special interest perspectives can be seen in the current debate on patent 
reform, where some interests represent non-practicing entities with large patent 
portfolios, some represent established businesses with patents such as Mi-
crosoft and Google, and some at least claim to represent venture capitalists and 
the start-up community. Each has potentially divergent interests on patent law.  
In the vernacular of Federalist 10, patents create “factions” in favor of long-
er terms, which combat other “factions” in favor of shorter terms, and this feud 
helps keep patent term lengths under control.329 In 1790, patent terms were 
fourteen years, and today they are twenty years.330 Additionally for most of the 
groups involved in lobbying on patent policy, patents are just one of many is-
sues they care about.331 As a result, they have to set lobbying priorities, rather 
than devoting all their firepower toward this one issue.  
But when it comes to copyright terms, as will be shown in the next section, 
the state of play is markedly different – there are no factions to fight factions 
on copyright terms.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
is somebody who tries to make a lot of money off a patent that they are not practicing and 
have no intention of practicing and in most cases never practiced.”). 
 326 Companies in the pharmaceutical industries would support longer patent terms 
whereas companies in the software industry benefit from shorter patent terms due to the 
nature of software innovation. See Posner, supra note 10. 
 327 Madison, supra note 27. 
 328 See American Foundry & Mfg. Co. v. Josam Mfg. Co., 79 F.2d 116, 117 (8th Cir. 
1935) (“A patent is a governmental grant of monopoly for the making, selling, and use of a 
novelty (disclosed therein) as claimed by the patent.”). 
 329 THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 53-55 (James Madison) (E.H. Scott ed., 1898). 
 330 Copyright Act of 1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124 (1790); 35 U.S.C. § 154(c) (2012). 
 331 See Erin Mershon & Tony Romm, Big Tech Tracks Are All Over D.C. Patent War, 
POLITICO (Apr. 27, 2014, 10:41 PM), http://politi.co/QUGFjl (“I get why companies are all 
fighting like crazy over this…’[t]heir business models are dependant on patents, and every-
body has a different stake in the patent system.’”). 
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C. Bringing a Knife to a Gunfight: One Sided Copyright Term Battles 
Deliberations on the last major copyright extension – 1998’s Sonny Bono 
Copyright Term Extension Act – began with a U.S. Copyright Office hearing 
in 1993 on whether to extend the duration to “life plus seventy.”332 At the time, 
the register reported that “perhaps because legislation did not appear on the 
horizon, only representatives who strongly supported increasing the term of 
protection appeared.”333 This is one advantage that special interests can take 
advantage of, having lobbyists on the ground gives them knowledge of upcom-
ing legislation and hearings before the general public knows, so it’s not entire-
ly surprising that they were the only ones represented. But once legislation was 
introduced and this legislative movement was known outside of the typical 
D.C. circles, this one-sided war did not change.  In 1995, with legislation now 
on the table: 
[N]o witness and no member of Congress expressed concern that the extant term of 
copyright protection was inadequate to encourage authors to create and distribute new 
works of authorship...[n]o witness or member of Congress suggested that circum-
stance or government action had prevented copyright owners from exploiting their 
works to the fullest extent during the copyright terms they had already enjoyed.334 
Under the Constitution, the operative question for lawmakers should have 
been how an extension would promote the progress of science or the useful 
arts, the Founders’ clear instructions.335 As mentioned, earlier, the 1909 report 
from the Senate Committee on Patents (S. 9440) noted that certain legislation 
would be beyond the power of Congress,336 that copyright law is “not primarily 
for the benefit for the author, but primarily for the benefit of the public.”337That 
report argued that “Congress must consider...two questions: [f]irst, how much 
will the legislation stimulate the producer and so benefit the public; and, se-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 332 Hearings on H.R. 989, H.R. 1248, and H.R., supra note 88, at 1 (statement of Hon. 
Carlos J. Moorhead, Chairman of the subcommittee). 
 333 Brief of Intellectual Property Law Professors as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners 
at 3, Eldred, et. al., v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003) (No. 01-618). 
 334 Id. at 6. 
 335 See Copyright Extremists Shouldn’t Control Information, supra note 10 (“The pur-
pose of copyright law is to provide incentives and protection to authors to create and publish 
original works, not give corporations the power to control the flow of information.”). 
 336 See COMM. ON PATENTS, TO AMEND AND CONSOLIDATE ACTS RESPECTING COPYRIGHT, 
H.R. REP. NO. 2222, at 6-7 (1909) 
The object of all legislation must be...to promote science and the useful arts...[T]he 
spirit of any act which Congress is authorized to pass must be one which will promote 
the progress of sciences and the useful arts, and unless it is designed to accomplish this 
result and is believed, in fact, to accomplish this result, it would be beyond the power 
of Congress. 
Id. 
 337 Id. at 7. 
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cond, how much will the monopoly granted be detrimental to the public.”338 
Congress must use copyright to confer “a benefit upon the public that out-
weighs the evils of the temporary monopoly.”339  
While this was the consensus from the Founding era until 1909, this frame-
work had no place in the discussion in 1995-1998 for the Sonny Bono Act, in 
fact such considerations appear never to have been discussed seriously, in large 
part because no interest group was forcing Congress to do so.340 Instead, delib-
erations were dominated almost completely by large content creators, who ac-
counted for roughly six percent of U.S. GDP and represented either the largest 
or second-largest U.S. export.341 In 1995-1998 they had significant lobbying 
influence, which has only grown more substantial through present day.342 
One of the main corporate copyright owners engaged in deliberations of the 
1997 bill was the Disney Corp., which led the charge for copyright term exten-
sion.343 Disney’s copyright on its flagship Mickey Mouse character had ac-
counted for up to $8 billion in revenue in 1998, they certainly had a lot to lose 
and no other company had anywhere close to a similar stake in seeing the leg-
islation fail.344 Then-Disney Chairman Michael Eisner met personally with 
then-Senate Majority Leader Trent Lott, R-Miss.,345 and Disney’s political ac-
tion committee contributed to Lott’s campaign on the same day that he signed 
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 339 Id. 
 340 See Marvin Ammori, The Uneasy Case for Copyright Extension, 16 HARV. J.L. & 
TECH. 288, 293 n. 32 (2002) (citing Intellectual Property Rights: Film Industry Perspective: 
Hearings on H.R. 2589 Before the Subcomm. on Int’l Econ. Policy and Trade of the House 
Int’l Relations Comm. 105th Cong. (1998) (statement of Bonnie J. K. Richard- son, Vice 
President, Trade and Federal Affairs, Motion Picture Association of America)) 
 341 Brief of the Sherwood Anderson Literary Estate Trust et al., as Amici Curiae Sup-
porting Appellants, Eldred v. Reno, 239 F.3d 372 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (No. 99-5430). 
 342 According to Opensecrets.org, an organization that tracks disclosure information, in 
1998, TV/Movies and Music related industry lobbying was $33 million, with 451 lobbyists. 
But in 2011 the next time the industry was pushing for major legislation, SOPA/PIPA, they 
spent $123.1 million lobbying, a 373% increase in annual spending. Further as for contribu-
tions to campaigns and PACs, in 1998 the industry spent $16.9 million, in 2012 they spent 
$65.9 million. See TV/Movies/Music, OPENSECRETS.ORG, 
https://www.opensecrets.org/lobby/indusclient.php?id=B02&year=1998 (last visited Nov. 8, 
2014) (1998 lobbying); see also TV/Movies/Music, OPENSECRETS.ORG, 
https://www.opensecrets.org/lobby/indusclient.php?id=B02&year=2011 (last visited Nov. 8, 
2014) (2011 lobbying); see also TV/Movies/Music, OPENSECRETS.ORG, 
https://www.opensecrets.org/industries/indus.php?ind=B02 (last visited Nov. 8, 2014) 
(campaign contributions). 
 343 Janet Wasko, The Magical-Market World of Disney, 52 MONTHLY REV., (2001). 
 344 Daren Fonda, Copyright’s Crusader, BOSTON GLOBE MAG. (Aug. 29, 1999), 
http://www.public.asu.edu/~dkarjala/commentary/Fonda8-29-99.html. 
 345 Disney Lobbying for Copyright Extension No Mickey Mouse Effort, CHI. TRIB. (Oct. 
17, 1998), http://www.public.asu.edu/~dkarjala/commentary/ChiTrib10-17-98.html. 
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on as co-sponsor of the bill.346  Within a month, Disney also gave “$20,000 in 
soft money to the National Republican Senatorial Committee.”347  In the House, 
“[o]f the thirteen initial sponsors…ten received contributions from Disney’s 
PAC”.348 Additionally, “on the Senate side, eight of the twelve sponsors re-
ceived contributions.”349   
For companies like Disney and trade associations like the MPAA, strong 
copyright protection is their most important lobbying issue and they are able to 
mobilize for action on this objective without hurting other efforts – this is very 
likely the biggest issue they cared about at the time. According to lobbying 
records and media accounts, there is no company with a comparable interest in 
shorter copyright terms.350 One industry completely dominated the discussion. 
Some in the content lobby have pointed to technology companies as a spe-
cial interest that confronts the content lobby in their agenda – but in the cases 
of term length in particular this conclusion is false, misleading and contradict-
ed by the evidence.351 This seems plausible given that big tech is certainly 
spending quite a bit of cash in Washington.352 Sometimes this narrative has 
even entered academic literature, as a journal article by Paul Schwartz and 
Georgetown Law Dean William Treanor argues “intellectual property issues 
frequently pit powerful economic actors against each other [and that] the polit-
ical process generally works well in this realm.”353 Treanor goes on to argue 
that eBay, Lexis and WestLaw have an interest in protecting their computer-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 346 Jesse Walker, Copy Catfight, REASON (Mar. 1, 2000, 12:00 AM), 
http://reason.com/archives/2000/03/01/copy-catfight. 
 347 Id. 
 348 Disney Lobbying for Copyright Extension No Mickey Mouse Effort, supra note 345. 
 349 Id. 
 350 See Why is Congress Criminalizing Copyright Law?, supra note 10 (“Congress seems 
intent on changing all our intellectual property laws to benefit big corporations.”); see also 
Why Disney Has Clout with the Republican Congress, supra note 10 
‘Limited time’ is not only a constitutional requirement, it is an excellent rule. There is 
no good reason for the remote descendants of James Madison, Julia Ward Howe, or 
Thomas Nast to receive royalties on the Federalist Papers, the Battle Hymn of the Re-
public, or Santa Claus. . . . [W]hy did Judiciary Committee Republicans quietly put 
through legislation that hurts the public interest but is so immensely profitable to Dis-
ney? 
Id. 
 351 See Copyright Extremists Shouldn’t Control Information, supra note 10 (“Copyright 
extremists…,the music labels and Hollywood argue that current laws are not strong enough, 
and they are lobbying for an assortment of new anti-consumer legislation. One proposal 
would allow them to vandalize computer networks that they believe might be transmitting 
unauthorized content.”). 
 352 Spending more than $61 million in 2013. Rich McCormick, Google Leads Pack as 
Ten Tech Firms Spend More than $61 Million Lobbying Washington, THE VERGE (Jan. 22, 
2014, 7:58 PM), http://bit.ly/1AlYyKE. 
 353 Paul Schwartz & William Treanor, Eldred and Lochner: Copyright Term Extension 
and Intellectual Property as Constitutional Property, 112 YALE L.J. 2331, 2405 (2003). 
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ized data vs. other companies who want free access, and concludes that 
“[t]hese companies seem well-matched in terms of economic resources and 
likely political clout.”354 He concludes the same with content providers pushing 
for anti-piracy technology and high-technology companies on the other side.355 
While much of this journal article is well researched and articulated, this por-
tion is demonstrably false – but it reflects a position commonly believed. 
Treanor is arguably correct that on data protection there are two major inter-
ests, and for piracy technologies there are two major interests; however, 
Treanor’s journal article is specifically an epitaph on copyright term lengths. 
Seeing two arguably even battles on copyright, battles that have been tradition-
ally dominated by the content industry, and therefore concluding that copyright 
term lengths must be the same is illogical. This is an example of common wis-
dom that is demonstrably incorrect.  
It is convenient for the content industry to be able to point to another “spe-
cial interest” group on the other side, but it’s not an accurate representation of 
the actual lobbying landscape on particular copyright issues. While technology 
companies sometimes have copyright related interests, such as for safe harbor 
under the DMCA, provisions which allow for user generated websites like 
Youtube, Facebook and Twitter to flourish, and provisions which they actively 
lobby on behalf of,356 there is no evidence of technology companies ever lobby-
ing against extension of copyright terms. Further, the main technology compa-
nies that the content industry points to as being their contender didn’t even 
exist during the last copyright term battle.357  
Term extensions are an issue that they have never devoted resources to con-
front, allowing for a one-sided special interest battle. Consider that while Dis-
ney had billions to gain from legislation, no technology company, or for that 
matter public interest group or other organization, had anything like a compa-
rable financial stake that would be forwarded by shortening copyright lengths 
or holding them steady. Makers of technologies like video cassette and digital 
video recorders, personal audio players and satellite television all have had 
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 356 See Gerald C. Pia Jr. & Brian C. Roche, Has The Internet Killed the Video Star, THE 
CONN. L. TRIB. 1 (Apr. 2007), http://bit.ly/1wtsUKg (“[T]he DMCA is also the result of 
lobbying by Internet and technology companies, who managed to obtain certain ‘Safe Har-
bors’.”). 
 357 Google was founded on September 4, 1998, Facebook was founded on February 4, 
2004, Twitter was founded on March 21, 2006. Company, GOOGLE, 
https://www.google.com/about/company/ (last visited Nov. 9, 2014) (Google incorporation 
date Sept. 4, 1998); Nicholas Carlson, At Last – The Full Story of How Facebook Was 
Founded, BUS. INSIDER (Mar. 5, 2010, 4:10 AM), ), http://read.bi/K5ZqN1 (Facebook 
launched Feb. 4, 2004); About, TWITTER, https://about.twitter.com/milestones (last visited 
Nov. 9, 2014) (co-founder Jack Dorsey sends first tweet on Twitter, Mar. 21, 2006). 
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run-ins with the content industry,358 but the length of copyright terms has been 
irrelevant to those legal feuds. Given large but limited lobbying assets, they 
largely avoid policy battles in which they don’t have a stake such as copyright 
terms. 
This perspective is bolstered by evidence from the hearings on the legisla-
tion, in the Senate Judiciary Committee report in 1996, Sen. Hank Brown, R-
Colo. – the panel’s only opponent to extending copyright terms – wrote that he 
“thought it was a moral outrage…[t]here wasn’t anyone speaking out for the 
public interest.”359 Another report on the deliberations described the bill’s op-
ponents as “a far weaker coalition of college professors, constitutional lawyers, 
librarians and small town school teachers.”360 There is no report of major tech-
nology companies.  
Today, the MPAA is even more powerful in manipulating the policy process 
than in 1998, which could be seen in their attempt to pass the Stop Online Pi-
racy Act (SOPA) and the Protect IP Act (PIPA) in 2012.361 After getting insuf-
ficient support from Members to pass that legislation in the face of 12 million 
Americans engaging to stop SOPA/PIPA, MPAA Chairman Chris Dodd, a 
former U.S. Senator from Connecticut, said: 
Candidly, those who count on quote ‘Hollywood’ for support need to understand that 
this industry is watching very carefully who’s going to stand up for them when their 
job is at stake…[d]on’t ask me to write a check for you when you think your job is at 
risk and then don’t pay any attention to me when my job is at stake.362 
This statement shows the head of Motion Picture Association of America 
(MPAA), while lobbying for Congress to pass SOPA/PIPA, telling members of 
Congress that if they don’t “pay any attention to me” on this issue, then Con-
gress should not “ask me to write a check for you.”363 This statement appears to 
say: if you do not do this official act, voting for our legislation, we will not 
give you money in the future.364 If a quid-pro-quo could be established, which 
this statement seems to show, it would be a felony,365 which is the embodiment 
of what James Madison warned future generations of many years ago, that we 
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“must guard these instruments with strictness ag[ainst] abuse.”366 Madison was 
worried about abuse likely because he knew how vested interests had used 
their connections with the King to get special favors for government monopo-
lies, and he likely knew that in the future a vested interest would gain a close 
relationship with government and use their influence to use copyrights and 
patents to gain new wealth and distort the purpose from the constitutional 
mandate, and thereby society would pay the cost of this abuse.367 
Dodd’s statement was met with public outrage and a White House petition 
demanding that the Administration investigate Chris Dodd for corruption stat-
ed that “[t]his is an open admission of bribery and a threat designed to provoke 
a specific policy goal.”368 Yet, after the petition received the required number 
of signatures for a response, the White House responded merely by saying that 
they won’t “comment on this petition because it requests a specific law en-
forcement action.”369 It does not appear that any investigation was ever con-
ducted. 
Within the year, the House Republican Study Committee issued the report 
previously mentioned here on potential ideas for copyright reform. After that 
report was released and received significant support from the conservative 
side, as well as a variety of outlets across the political spectrum, the report was 
taken off-line under pressure from special interest groups representing the con-
tent industry – and within 24 hours.370 
Suspicion of cronyism is not a perspective only held by outside observers; 
even congressional organizations have recognized the legislative process as 
being manipulated by special interests.371 The Young Guns Network’s Room to 
Grow Report, representing Majority Leader Kevin McCarthy, former Majority 
Leader Eric Cantor and Chairman of the House Budget Committee Paul Ryan 
among others, concluded that current copyright terms were the direct result of 
cronyism rather than thoughtful policy considerations – and they are certainly 
in a position to know about the influence of the content industry upon their 
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own members of Congress.372 Furthermore, the Room to Grow Report conclud-
ed, “over the years, copyright and patent law have evolved into cronyist pro-
tection of the revenue of powerful incumbent companies – a type of regulation 
that hampers innovation and entrepreneurship.”373 This is an organization cre-
ated by House leadership that is saying that “powerful incumbent companies” 
have turned copyright terms into “cronyist protection.” 
It should not be a surprise that of the twenty-six current members of the 
House Judiciary Subcommittee on Intellectual Property, at least eighteen re-
ceived donations from the RIAA, MPAA and Disney for the 2012 and 2014 
cycles.374 MPAA, RIAA and Disney have been working with the Chamber of 
Commerce on lobbying for stronger copyright policy and for longer copyright 
terms in our international treaties.375 The Chamber of Commerce has spent over 
$1 billion dollars lobbying from 1998 till 2013, and strong copyright protection 
has been a major priority.376 In fact, according to Opensecrets.org, a non-profit 
organization that researches and documents public filing information on lobby-
ing and campaign donations, there has been a 358% increase in lobbying dol-
lars for industries related to movies, music and TV from 1998 to 2012 (2012 
being the last major copyright battle that the industry engaged in, 
SOPA/PIPA).377 From 1998/2012, the industry increased PAC and campaign 
donations by roughly 389%, from $16.9 million in 1998 to $65.9 million in 
2012.378 
D. Trans-Pacific Partnership and ‘Life+100’ 
In the past several years, 600 “cleared advisors” representing special inter-
ests and industry have been involved in closed-door negotiations over the pro-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 372 See id. 
 373 See id. 
 374 See R Street Policy Study No. 20, supra note 6, at 19. 
 375 See, e.g., GLOBAL INTELL. PROP. CENTER U.S. CHAMBER OF COM., LETTER FROM 1-800 
CONTACTS ET AL TO MEMBERS OF UNITED STATES CONGRESS (2011) (including MPAA, RI-
AA, The Walt Disney Company, and U.S. Chamber of Commerce as signatorees of a letter 
to Congress advocating new legislation to protect copyright on the internet). 
 376 David Steinbach, Billion Dollar Baby: U.S. Chamber if First to Hit Lobbying Mile-
stone, OPENSECRETS BLOG (July 23, 2013), http://bit.ly/13kLmsR; see Intellectual Property, 
U.S. CHAMBER OF COM. (Aug. 4, 2010, 8:00 PM), https://www.uschamber.com/intellectual-
property-0 (“The mission of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce’s Global Intellectual Property 
Center is to champion intellectual property as a vital engine of global development, growth, 
and human progress.”). 
 377 See Lobbying 1998, supra note 342 (lobbying total for 1998, $32,981,988); see also 
Lobbying 2012, supra note 342 (lobbying total for 2012, $118,015,007). 
 378 See Campaign Contributions, supra note 342 (table providing the campaign contribu-
tion totals from 1990-2014). 
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posed Trans-Pacific Partnership Treaty (TPP).379 The content industry is well 
represented in this process, but the general public and alternative perspectives 
are not.380 In 2009, twenty-eight organizations filed fifty-nine lobbying reports 
and the draft TPP includes provisions that are pretty generous for the pharma-
ceutical industry and in favor of much stronger intellectual property protec-
tion.381  
Of the other current members on the ITAC’s fifteen advisory committees, 
advisory committees for negotiations, there appears to be only one representa-
tive with a differing perspective on copyright from that of the content indus-
try.382 A seat was given to Yahoo’s Laura Covington who is their Vice Presi-
dent of Intellectual Property policy.383 Yahoo has registered to lobby on copy-
right and trademark matters “including Copyright Act reform” but, as is pre-
dictable, Yahoo’s disclosure lists “safe harbors/intermediary liability protec-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 379 William Mauldin, U.S. Says Not ‘Rushing’ Asia-Pacific Trade Deal, WALL ST. J. 
(Sept. 26, 2013), http://on.wsj.com/1x5aiCd. 
 380 For example, the Vice President of the Recording Industry Association of America 
(RIAA), Neil Turkewitz, and Roy Kaufman, Managing Director of New Ventures at the 
Copyright Clearance Center are on the Industry Trade Advisory Committee on Intellectual 
Property Rights (ITAC 15). Industry Trade Advisory Committee on Intellectual Property 
Rights ITAC15, INT’L TRADE ASS’N, http://ita.doc.gov/itac/committees/itac15.asp (last visit-
ed Sept. 27, 2014). The Copyright Clearance Center is a “global rights broker for [. . .] 
books, journals, newspapers, magazines, images, blogs and ebooks.” About us, COPYRIGHT 
CLEARANCE CENTER, http://www.copyright.com/content/cc3/en/toolbar/aboutUs.html (last 
visited Sept. 27, 2014). Other members on the board include Timothy Trainer, President of 
Galaxy Systems, Inc., which “represent[s] clients in a variety of IPR related matters. . .” 
Industry Trade Advisory Committee on Intellectual Property Rights ITAC15, INT’L TRADE 
ASS’N, http://ita.doc.gov/itac/committees/itac15.asp (last visited Sept. 27, 2014). Another 
member, Erin-Michael Gill, is Executive Vice President of Qbase representing the MDB 
Capital Group LLC. Id. MDB Capital Group LLC called itself “The IP Investment Bank” 
and that it helped “Build strategically positioned IP portfolios that protect competitive ad-
vantage and create licensing revenue streams.” Building Dominant IP Strategies MDB Capi-
tal Intellectual Property Development Services, MDB CAPITAL GROUP, 
http://bit.ly/16zzXaD (last visited Sept. 27, 2014). Their interests, while mainly on the pa-
tent side, are, in this author’s opinion, obviously for stronger copyright and patent monopo-
lies. See generally id. The other interests represented include: Gilead Sciences, Cisco, Veri-
zon, General Electric Aviation, Johnson & Johnson, Infectious Disease Research Institute, 
Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America, Biotechnology Industry Organiza-
tion, General Dynamics Advanced Information Systems, and Mylan Pharmaceuticals, Inc. 
Industry Trade Advisory Committee on Intellectual Property Rights ITAC15, INT’L TRADE 
ASS’N, http://ita.doc.gov/itac/committees/itac15.asp (last visited Sept. 27, 2014). 
 381 Lee Drutman, How Big Pharma (and others) began lobbying on the Trans-Pacific 
Partnership before you ever heard of it, SUNLIGHT FOUND. (Mar. 13, 2014, 9:10 AM), 
http://sunlightfoundation.com/blog/2014/03/13/tpp-lobby/. 
 382 See Industry Trade Advisory Committee on Intellectual Property Rights ITAC15, 
supra note 380 (Laura H. Covington, Esq. Vice President, Intellectual Property Policy, Ya-
hoo! Inc.). 
 383 Id. 
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tions” not copyright term length.384 A cursory review of ITAC’s fifteen mem-
bers does not show a single representative that has argued for not extending 
copyright terms.385  
Previous members of ITAC fifteen included the Vice President of the Enter-
tainment Software Association, Stevan Mitchell, the Association represents 
rights holders for software that have favored and lobbied for stronger intellec-
tual property; Thomas Thomson, who is the Executive Director of the “Coali-
tion for Intellectual Property Rights,” which advocates for stronger intellectual 
property laws and is a coalition of rights holders,386 as well as, allegedly, some-
one from the Motion Picture Association of America (MPAA).387 Furthermore, 
there are various accounts of representatives from other interests being deliber-
ately excluded.388 The Computer and Communications Industry Association 
(CCIA) represents many tech companies such as Google and generally favors 
more balanced copyright and patent protection,389 but when CCIA nominated 
copyright lawyer, Andrew Bridges, whose career includes defending innova-
tors against copyright lawsuits and has been outspoken in favor of copyright 
reform to the ITAC Fifteen advisory panel, he was rejected.390 Furthermore, no 
representatives from public interest-oriented organizations like the Electronic 
Frontier Foundation (EFF), Knowledge Ecology International, or Public 
Knowledge have ever been allowed to join ITAC Fifteen.391 When government 
specifically excludes all public interest groups or entities with a different per-
spective, it’s easy to claim that the committee has a consensus in favor of long-
er copyright terms; therefore, government actors can argue that there is no 
problem associated with longer copyright terms because no one on the adviso-
ry committee brought up such a problem. But this intentional selection bias is a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 384 Yahoo! Inc, OPENSECRETS.ORG, http://bit.ly/13kLpVq (last visited Sept. 27, 2014). 
 385 INDUS. TRADE ADVISORY COMM. ON INTELLECTUAL PROP. RIGHTS, ITAC-15, ADVISO-
RY COMMITTEE REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT, THE CONGRESS AND THE UNITED STATES TRADE 
REPRESENTATIVE ON THE U.S.-PANAMA TRADE PROMOTION AGREEMENT (TPA) 24 (2007), 
available at 
http://www.ustr.gov/archive/assets/Trade_Agreements/Bilateral/Panama_FTA/Reports/asset
_upload_file960_11234.pdf; James Love, Who USTR clears to see secret text for IPR nego-
tiations? (Such as TPPA), KEIONLINE.ORG (Feb. 16, 2012, 8:49), 
http://keionline.org/node/1362. 
 386 INDUS. TRADE ADVISORY COMM. ON INTELLECTUAL PROP. RIGHTS, supra note 385; 
Love, supra note 385. 
 387 Margot Kaminski, The Capture of International Intellectual Property Law through 
the U.S. Trade Regime, 87 S. CAL. L. REV. 977, 1001 (2014). 
 388 See, e.g., Timothy B. Lee, Here’s Why Obama Trade Negotiators Push the Interests 
of Hollywood and Drug Companies, WASH. POST (Nov. 26, 2013), http://wapo.st/1v8sMvp. 
 389 Members, COMPUTER & COMM. INDUSTRY ASS’N., 
http://ccia.wpengine.com/about/members/ (last visited Sept. 27, 2014). 
 390 Kaminski, supra note 387; Lee, supra note 388. 
 391 See generally Industry Trade Advisory Committee on Intellectual Property Rights 
ITAC15, supra note 380. 
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feature and not a bug to provide the intended perspective, for the policy mak-
ers. It’s long been a Washington trick to invite others with your opinion to ad-
vise you on your opinion, and then to argue that there was a consensus in favor 
of that opinion – that’s essentially what appears to be happening with the ITAC 
process. 
If ratified, the TPP treaty – which involves twelve countries – would cover 
approximately forty percent of global trade,392 and set the bar for another pro-
posed treaty being negotiated with European countries, the Transatlantic Trade 
and Investment Partnership (TTIP).393 Among the provisions of this treaty are 
setting a bar for copyright durations.394 From a leaked draft, it has been re-
vealed that the treaty includes language that would permanently lock in “life 
plus seventy” copyright terms.395 Mexico was proposing a longer copyright 
term of “life plus 100,” which – as of August 2013 – the United States had nei-
ther accepted nor rejected.396 
The TPP, as leaked, is a clear illustration of policy laundering. Special inter-
ests cannot defend life plus seventy copyright terms in the United States, so 
instead they use an international treaty-making process to tie Congress’s hand. 
The content lobby has done this effectively with numerous other treaties and 
this method has been their modus operandi for decades.397 But unlike other 
treaties involving copyright and patents, this treaty process has been subject to 
unprecedented secrecy: even members of Congress initially were unable to 
access the treaty.398 Today, they can access the treaty, but none of their staff is 
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http://1.usa.gov/1v0Fmfh (last visited Sept. 27, 2014). 
 393 See Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (T-TIP), OFF. OF THE U.S. TRADE 
REPRESENTATIVE, http://www.ustr.gov/ttip (last visited Sept. 10, 2014). 
 394 See generally Secret TPP treaty: Advanced Intellectual Prop. chapter for all 12 na-
tions with negotiating positions, WIKILEAKS (Nov. 13, 2013), 
https://wikileaks.org/tpp/index.html#start (Articles Q.Q.G.6 and Q.Q.G.7). 
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 396 Cyrus Farivar, Secret treaty leaks, Mexico wants copyright extended even more than 
US does, ARS TECHNICA (Nov. 13, 2013, 5:56 PM), http://bit.ly/1r7URGM. 
 397 See U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT RELATIONS OF THE UNITED 
STATES 1 (2014) (“[T]he Berne Convention for Protection of Literary Artistic Work; the 
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 398 See Commc’n Office, IYCMI: Wyden Statement Introducing “Congressional Over-
sight Over Trade Negotiations Act, RON WYDEN SENATOR FOR OREGON (May 23, 2012), 
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dentials, my staff is still barred from viewing the details of the proposals that USTR is ad-
vancing.”). 
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allowed to assist them.399 
Members of Congress can go to the USTR offices by themselves and be 
provided with a copy of the text to view, but cannot take note, make copies or 
bring uncleared staff.400 It’s incredible that MPAA and Comcast appear to be 
given access to the draft of the treaty, while the public, congressional staff, and 
public interest groups like EFF/PK/KEI are not. Further, groups with one vest-
ed interest are given access to the treaty in a manner that they can actually use 
and influence, whereas members of Congress are effectively unable to actively 
influence the process or oversee it. 
The TPP treaty is, in some ways, a very complicated document. The average 
member of Congress should not be expected to go to a closed room environ-
ment, without staff, and be able to read the treaty, understand exactly what it 
means, and retain everything in the treaty without notes. Industry is certainly 
not expected to do so, and the industries that are cleared are given a free pass 
to access the treaty. Saying that Congress can access the treaty in such an envi-
ronment is a bit of a dog and pony show where the U.S. Trade Representative 
can pretend that he’s allowing for Congress to be involved and oversee the 
negotiation, when it’s functionally impossible for Congress to play any over-
sight role through this method. To claim this allows for legitimate oversight by 
Congress is similar to a dictator claiming his citizens elected him when he was 
the only candidate on the ballot. Procedurally Congress may have technical 
access, but has no actual way to provide substantive oversight in this process. 
If the United States signs the TPP Treaty with a provision of minimum “life 
plus seventy” copyright duration provision, it will make it nearly impossible 
for Congress to ever consider implementing reforms that are more consistent 
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With Senate Staffers, TECHDIRT (June 25, 2012, 3:46 PM), http://bit.ly/1zFjyej. 
 400 See Commc’n Office, supra note 398. 
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with our founding tradition.401 Closing the door to any potential reform is a 
substantial change in U.S. policy, because it would tie Congress’ hands just as 
lawmakers are beginning to reconsider these policies.   
Shortly after the 2012 House Republican Study Committee report calling for 
shorter copyright terms, in 2013, the head of the U.S. Copyright Office men-
tioned the desirability of considering shorter copyright terms, specifically hav-
ing the last twenty years of life plus seventy be potentially optional, and called 
for the “Next Great Copyright Act.”402 The House Judiciary Committee re-
sponded with a series of hearings on copyright reform, going section by section 
through U.S. copyright law on potential reforms.403 The Commerce Department 
released a green paper advising on potential reforms to deal with orphan 
works, remixing and other issues.404 Now in 2014 House Leadership’s Young 
Gun Network is calling for shorter copyright terms.405 If the White House signs 
the TPP treaty, as drafted so far, it could make reform almost impossible. By 
removing any prospect of reform from the table, it would be a nearly unprece-
dented policy coup for the content lobby in their attempt to effectively repeal 
the Constitution’s Copyright Clause. 
Instead of Congress signing a new treaty to further lock in U.S. copyright 
law,406 it should reconsider how it can best restore constitutional copyright, and 
what international agreements may need to be renegotiated in order to restore 
our founding principles. 
In 1998, special interest groups lobbied Congress to pass copyright exten-
sion to life plus seventy, thereby keeping their works under copyright for an-
other twenty years.407 In 2018, with the prospect of billions of dollars of copy-
righted works falling into the public domain,408 it is extremely likely that these 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 401 Shortening copyright terms would then require completely revising the TPP treaty. 
 402 The Register’s Call for Updates to U.S. Copyright Law, supra note 310, at 1 (State-
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Nation’s copyright laws.”). 
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 406 See Secret TPP treaty: Advanced Intellectual Property Chapter, WIKILEAKS  1 (Nov. 
13, 2013), https://wikileaks.org/tpp/static/pdf/Wikileaks-secret-TPP-treaty-IP-chapter.pdf 
(WikiLeaks obtained and published a draft version of the treaty text that was negotiated in 
secret by 12 nations, whose members account for 40% of global GDP). 
 407 Copyright Term Extension Act of 1998, S. 505, 105th Cong. (1998); 17 U.S.C. § 302 
(2012); see Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 193 (2003) (explaining that the 1998 Act 
largely took existing protections and simply extended them 20 years). 
 408 See Rachel Soloveichik & David Wasshausen, Beaurue of Econ. Analysis, Copy-
right‐Protected Assets in the National Accounts, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE 1, 7-8 (2013), 
http://1.usa.gov/1AOtcut (describing that 2007 levels of investment and the market for soft-
ware and entertainment originals reached several hundred billions); see also Fonda, supra 
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same interest groups will be back before Congress to argue for longer copy-
right terms. They’ll bring with them substantial PAC contributions and likely 
will push for life plus 100, since that is the copyright term of Mexico and there 
will be an argument that we must be “consistent” with such “international” 
copyright law.  Unless Congress guards copyright against further abuse, these 
special interests will ensure that new works will never enter the public domain. 
E. A Word on the Berne Convention 
An elephant in the room for substantive discussions on reforming copyright 
term length has been the Berne Convention, which the United States ratified in 
1988, nearly a century after the first country ratified the proposed Convention 
in 1886 (Switzerland).409 The Berne Convention threw out much of U.S. copy-
right law, and Berne was resisted for over a century because it was so incon-
sistent with U.S. legal tradition on copyright.410  The fact that the United States 
rejected this international convention is quite significant, as the United States 
of America was “the single, commercially most important country to remain 
outside the Berne Union for its entire first century.”411 Preceding the United 
States joining the Berne Convention, the U.S. removed several central tenets of 
U.S. copyright law such as requiring that work be registered to receive copy-
right.412 The existing copyright terms were twenty-eight years with an optional 
twenty-eight year renewal for a total of fifty-six years (Copyright Act of 1909), 
but copyright was extended to life of the author plus fifty years in 1976 as re-
quired in the Berne Convention.413 
Other treaties, such as TRIPS (Article 9), solidify these treaty obligations, as 
do several bilateral treaties.414 But Berne does not preclude all copyright re-
form, for example going back to life plus fifty copyright terms is acceptable 
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under the Berne convention,415 and should be explored by Congress immediate-
ly. 
Observers have been too quick to assume that Berne precludes long-term 
substantive revisions of U.S. copyright policy.416 The United States is currently 
drafting international treaties, defining the new global standards on copyright 
and patent matters; therefore, it is a convenient, but illogical, excuse for the 
U.S. to say “we can’t revise U.S. copyright policy because it’s in a treaty” 
when the U.S. wrote the most recent treaties and has been the major advocate 
for these positions around the world.417 The U.S. could certainly use that trade 
power and influence that they are currently using to push copyright policy in 
one direction, to instead advocate to make copyright policy better, perhaps not 
immediately, but over the course of years. Copyright policy is a long-term pro-
cess – advocates for the Berne Convention pushed for that treaty for over 100 
years.  Flippant responses that copyright can never be shortened because the 
Berne Convention precludes immediate action, is illogical based on the histori-
cal developments of copyright policy being inherently long-term driven. 
The United States resisted the Berne Convention for over 100 years because 
generations of elected leaders believed it was inconsistent with U.S. copyright 
law.418 The United States has pulled out of treaties before.419 If policy makers 
firmly believed that Berne violated the U.S. Constitution’s language on copy-
right, then we would have an obligation to withdraw from Berne, or not recog-
nize those portions. While Berne is an influential treaty that covers the world, 
it should not preclude the U.S. from finding and advocating for the best, and 
most constitutionally consistent, copyright policy. 
The original Berne Convention had only ten countries represented.420 But the 
United States and Japan were only observers,421 Liberia didn’t ratify the treaty 
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1928, Revised at Brussells on Jun. 26, 1948, and Revised at Stockholm on Jul. 14, 1967, 828 
UNTS 221, 235 (1972). 
 416 Edward Lee, Copyright, Death, and Taxes, 47 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1, 3 (2012). 
 417 Dennis S. Karjala, United States Adherence to the Berne Convention and Copyright 
Protection of Information-Based Technologies, 28 JURIMETRICS J. 147, 147-48, 150-51 
(1988). 
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 419 See e.g., Wade Boese, U.S. Withdraws From ABM Treaty; Global Response Muted, 
ARMS CONTROL ASS’N, http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2002_07-08/abmjul_aug02 (last 
visited Sep. 10, 2014) (United States withdrew from 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty in 
2002). 
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and Tunisia was a French colony,422 meaning that the Berne Convention was 
really an agreement of eight sovereign nations: Germany, Belgium, Spain, 
France, United Kingdom, Haiti,423 Italy, and Switzerland.424 This is certainly not 
representative of the modern economy, and it may not have been representative 
of the 19th century economy.425 The Berne Convention would expand but as 
drafted, it reflects the perspective of eight countries in the 19th century, a per-
spective that was vastly different from that of our Founders. Eventually most 
countries in the world would be forced to join the Berne Convention, in part 
because of TRIPS Article 9, and in part because the treaty was written to give 
special treatment to signatories creating an incentive for other nations to join.426 
Today, the United States is the strongest advocate of longer copyright terms 
around the world, currently pushing Pacific Rim countries to expand their cop-
yright terms from life plus fifty under Berne to life plus seventy under the TPP 
as drafted.427  In these negotiations we have found many other countries reluc-
tant to embrace such long copyright terms, among other concerns.428 If the 
United States changed its position and decided to favor shorter copyright 
terms, such a move would likely be broadly supported by a number of coun-
tries that have been reluctant to sign onto Berne to begin with.  
Imagine if India (joined Berne in 1928),429 Australia (joined Berne in 
1928),430 South Korea (joined Berne in 1996),431Japan (joined Berne in 1899),432 
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 426 See Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sep. 9, 1886, 
supra note 415, at 221 (various articles and provisions throughout outline the process of 
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 427 See Secret TPP treaty: Advanced Intellectual Property Chapter, supra note 406, at 
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 428 The leaked draft indicates that negotiators from “VN/BN/NZ/MY/CA/JP” oppose the 
extension to 70 years. These countries are presumed to be: Vietnam, Brunei, New Zealand, 
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9, 2014). 
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Russia (joined Berne in 1995),433 China (joined Berne 1992),434 Middle Eastern 
countries and African countries teamed together with the United States to cre-
ate a more rational system that did a better job of protecting copyright holders, 
but for a copyright term that was based on economic data rather than lobbying 
manipulation. If a consensus could be reached of these countries,435 which is 
the point of trade agreements, such a new convention could become the new 
international standard.  
Together these countries, all excluded from the original drafting of Berne, 
represent the vast majority of world population, economic activity and, most 
importantly, content creation. A survey of movie production from 2010 
showed these countries dwarfed traditional Berne supporters by feature film 
output as India, U.S., China, Japan and South Korea represent 73.6% of top-ten 
production by country.436 U.S., China, Russia, India, Japan and Turkey make 
up 74.69% of top-ten book production.437 Both percentages go up when you 
look broader than just the top-ten, to over 80%.438  
Neither of these percentages on content creation are scientific studies but ra-
ther use raw output for the purposes of establishing a rough proxy of influence 
in negotiation.439 This demonstrates that a potential post-Berne coalition in the 
twenty-first century, that may have a different perspective on copyright than 
the Berne original signatories from the nineteenth century, represents a sizable 
block and the modern economy is shifting more from the original Berne eight 
countries every day. None of these potential countries were original partici-
pants in Berne (other than the U.S. and Japan as observers) and were effective-
ly forced to accept an already negotiated system.  
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 435 This is not to downplay how difficult achieving such a consensus could be. China in 
particular has been very reluctant to substantively enforce copyright provisions. 
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Today, more than eighty percent of the world content creators could come to 
a separate agreement, call it the “Berne Modernization Treaty,” and if they did 
so, given their collective market power, the rest of world may be forced to go 
along.440 The Berne Convention’s genius was to create benefit for the partici-
pants and to effectively hurt those not in the treaty, if such a similar apparatus 
could be built in a 21st century world economy, it could supersede Berne. For 
example, some provisions of this hypothetical treaty could be set to only go 
into effect when a certain number of countries join the convention, meaning 
that lots of countries could jump from the Berne convention together without a 
short term risk of violating the Berne Convention but not having another simi-
lar convention. 
A treaty from the nineteenth century, negotiated by eight countries that no 
longer represent the global economy, that appears to directly violate the 
Founder’s intentions on copyright policy, can be replaced with a more modern 
global treaty. What other such global treaties from the nineteenth century re-
main binding? The Geneva Convention from 1864 and the Paris Convention 
from 1883 appear to be the only other similar global conventions. 
Such a reconsideration of global copyright policy, as advocated here, may 
not just be the interests of the general public and content creators, but could 
also benefit the interest of rights holders like MPAA and RIAA as well that are 
looking for enforceable provisions to clamp down on piracy in China, Russia 
and India.441 Further, China has restrictions on the number of U.S. films that 
can be imported every year442 – such provisions should be made illegal under 
this new treaty, and removing that barrier would have a major benefit for the 
movie industry. 
The United States is currently negotiating new international treaties with Pa-
cific Rim countries and Europe, collectively constituting the majority of U.S. 
trade.443 If policymakers believed that shorter copyright terms were more con-
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20131028-story.html (discussing pirated content websites in China and Russia); see also 
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sistent with the U.S. Constitution, better for the economy, and better for aver-
age citizens, then a longer-term strategy for treaty renegotiation could gradual-
ly extricate ourselves from our existing commitments, not dig us in further. 
VI. CONCLUSION  
Policymakers who care about the original public meaning of the Constitu-
tion must not abandon our constitutional obligation. We must heed James 
Madison’s warning: to guard these instruments against abuse.444 The econo-
mists’ consensus on this issue is clear: the free market, with a short term of 
copyright regulation, leads to the most optimal outcome of competition and 
allocation of resources.445 As the Nobel laureates and other economists argued 
in their Eldred brief, a “lengthened copyright term...keeps additional materials 
out of new creators’ hands” and ultimately results in “fewer new works.”446  
Congress must confront special interests pushing for provisions in the 
Trans-Pacific Partnership Treaty that would make restoring constitutional cop-
yright impossible. If Congress once again extends copyright in 2018, to ensure 
that works from the 1920s never enter the public domain, then what is the limit 
on duration? The de facto status really would be perpetual copyright, just on 
the installment plan.447 The public domain of the future cannot be protected 
without constraints on prospective copyright duration; otherwise it won’t exist. 
It’s ultimately up to Congress to determine where the financial incentive will 
outweigh the societal costs of what the Founders called a “monopoly.” This is 
a data based question and every economic analysis conducted on the subject 
demonstrates the need for a shorter copyright duration than we have today. 
Overall, we can be supporters of a copyright regime that protects and com-
pensates creators, a noble goal, while recognizing that the current system has 
gone haywire. It’s time to restore our founding principles and recognize that 
constitutional copyright would unleash new creativity and economic growth.  
A copyright term closer to that envisioned by our Founders, modified accord-
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ing to modern economic conditions, would be good for innovators, good for 
content creators and good for the public at large. 
 
